one good revolution deserves another

Well, guys, it’s over. We had a good run. We had Tony Soprano, Don Draper (back when he was fun), McNulty and Barksdale and Stringer (oh my), Al Swearengen, Hank Moody (back when he was fun), Vincent Chase, Homer Simpson, J.D. and Turk, three generations of Bluth men, two versions of The Office, and assorted male vampires. It was all about us and our troubled male identities. I mean, sure, we had the money, the power, and the upper hand in relationships, but what did it all mean? Because you can still feel lonely in the middle of a penthouse, you know.

Really, isn’t the perfect metaphor for the decline and fall of masculinity on television what happened with Luck? Nary a woman in sight, and still the men sit around, waiting to get paid for doing nothing, until finally three horses die and the show gets canceled.

Now a majority of the best shows, beyond a doubt, are powered by women: Girls, Smash, Cougar Town, Nurse Jackie, Enlightened, Web Therapy, New Girl, The United States of Tara, The Secret Circle, Revenge. This is not the fake girl power of Alias or Chuck, or the hollow regime of Nancy Botwin on Weeds. (Or the fake girl power of Joss Whedon’s shows; they were all great, but none of them were especially pro-woman, including Buffy.) It’s a real passing of the torch.

The shows that are trying, despite everything, to hang onto the old gender roles just don’t stay interesting: for example, Mad Men, Sons of Anarchy, and The Vampire Diaries. Meanwhile, I am certain that Mallory Archer, Jessica Pearson, Lisa Cuddy, and Nan Flanagan get together to unwind over G&Ts.

Similarly, the thing that bugs me about Community right now has everything to do with its critiques of egotism, but perhaps not in the way you’d expect: the problem with its critiques of egotism is that it treats Joel McHale’s ego as if it is still the most important thing in the universe. It’s way more troubled and concerned about Jeff’s problems than it is about Britta or Annie, but there’s really nothing all that special about Jeff. Once upon a time, back in Season 1, he was a hotshot lawyer, but he hasn’t shown many signs of brains or charisma lately.

In fact, there are only a few viable forms of male identity right now: the whipped-but-beloved guy, the gay guy, the rich guy, the hermit (hi Louie!), and the nerdy genius. (We tried out “the stoned guy” for a while, but he didn’t make the cut.) Even the superheroes fall into these categories, although, aside from some afterschool special moments on X-Men, we’re still not really comfortable with gay superheroes.

The sidekicks are suddenly extremely uncomfortable with their subject-positions. Wilson keeps trying to escape from House. Troy is perpetually uneasy when he’s around Abed, unless it’s the end of an episode. John Watson exclaims, in utter exasperation, “In case anyone still cares, I’M NOT GAY!” “Well, I am,” Irene Adler shoots back, cool as a cucumber.

What’s so embarrassing about the rich guys, like Merc Lapidus, and the nerdy guys, like House/Sherlock or Walter White, is that their power is founded upon sexism. But these thrones are in jeopardy, and the symbols are getting rather overt; one of the strongest men on television right now, Tyrion Lannister, is going to end up crossing the desert to find Daenerys Targaryen, in order to give her The Iron Throne.

It’s all pretty wonderful, and it pinpoints the great unsolved problem confronting our society right now: the problem of anxiety. All this excitement over S&M isn’t just about power. It’s about anxiety, which can be soothed either by taking control or by losing it. The women on Girls are fascinating and hilarious, but their anxieties aren’t — their anxieties torture both them and us. In Enlightened, Amy Jellicoe flees to Hawaii to escape from anxiety and rage; in Web Therapy, Kudrow’s self-consciousness makes therapy impossible. Claire Dunphy is unbearable most of the time.

That doesn’t mean that things used to be better. In the old days, Tony Soprano was guzzling Prozac, and Pete Campbell was, well, Pete Campbell. Plus, I’ll take Lafayette Reynolds, Omar Little, and Cameron Tucker any day over characters like Vito Spatafore or Salvatore Romano. Vito and Sal basically get chucked back in the closet so we can feel their pain from a safe distance. (Also, for unclear reasons, all gay men used to be Italian.) Louis C.K. is an engine that runs on pure, high-octane anxiety, like Woody Allen before him.

Power doesn’t just corrupt people. It also drives them insane, and the first prickings of that insanity are sweat and goosebumps. But anxiety is a bigger phenomenon, even, than extremes of power: we put incredible effort into straining for the imaginary midpoint between panic attacks on the one hand, and stoner apathy on the other. Thank goodness that everybody, male and female, gay and straight, is now part of the same fight against the same monster. Daenerys’s enchanting little pets grow up, and once they do, there is no pleasure or joy they do not envy, or that they cannot steal.

a la ventura: cassie’s syncopated heart

The genius of the heart who silences all that is loud and self-satisfied, teaching it to listen; who smooths rough souls and lets them taste a new desire — to lie still as a mirror, that the deep sky may mirror itself in them [...] the genius of the heart from whose touch everyone walks away richer, not haveing received grace and surprised, not as blessed and oppressed by alien goods, but richer in himself, newer to himself than before, broken open, blown at and sounded out by a thawing wind, perhaps more unsure, tenderer, more fragile, more broken, but full of hopes that as yet have no name, full of new will and currents, full of new dissatisfaction and undertows [...] namely, no less a one than the god Dionysus, that great ambiguous one.
-Friedrich Nietzsche

Even the greatest stars discover themselves in the looking glass [...]
She made up the person she wanted to be
And changed into a new personality

-Siouxsie And The Banshees, “Hall of Mirrors”

“It was nice to experience other people.” -Cassie Ventura, in response to questions about her forthcoming album

The two most traditional aspects of dancing — the formal art, and the public ritual of courtship — have gradually separated from each other. Technical skill has been incorporated into competitive dance, and especially into troupe dancing, which is inspiring (and a little intimidating, to me anyway, even though I do Support Our Troupes). Public courtship has become a free-form, Dionysian celebration at clubs, concerts, and festivals. Dance has become more playful; when you’re not dancing with anyone in particular, there aren’t any rules.

Dancing by yourself is a game you play with who you are, which is why the image of dancing in front of a mirror has always been so irresistible. The best mirror song, “The Man In The Mirror,” was written by Michael Jackson, the same man who essentially invented modern solo dancing. “You” are somewhere between your body and its reflection. In musical terms, that places you somewhere between the accent (i.e. the beat) and the unaccented measure — between who you are and who you could be.

This is not without its frightening side. The Kraftwerk song “Hall of Mirrors,” and the cover by Siouxsie, are terrifying. Britney’s always used solitude to scary effect, most recently in “Hold It Against Me,” where she beats the shit out of herself. The “it” is, of course, “your body,” which is as much a prison as it is a playground.

Jacques Lacan is not always the clearest writer, but he’s the authority on this issue thanks to his essay on “The Mirror Stage,” where he writes,

The jubilant assumption of his [image in the mirror] by the [infant] still trapped in his motor impotence [...] seems to me to manifest in an exemplary situation the symbolic matrix in which the I is precipitated in a primordial form [...] the total form of his body, by which the subject anticipates the maturation of his power in a mirage [...] that freezes it and in a symmetry that reverses it, in opposition to the turbulent movements [that is, the dance] with which the subject feels he animates it.

This culminates in “the finally donned armor of an alienating identity that will mark his entire mental development with its rigid structure.” In other words, the infant moves from playing with his limbs, to feeling trapped by them, to trying to dominate his situation by over-identifying himself with his own prison: “this is me.” This ends in madness:

The subject’s capture by his situation gives us the most general formulation of madness — the kind found within the asylum as well as the kind that deafens the world with its sound and fury.

Lacan feels that “psychoanalysis alone” recognizes “the knot of imaginary servitude that love must always untie anew or sever,” but he is wrong. Music recognizes it as well. The trick is to use the mirrors themselves to disturb the pattern and provoke an unsettled openness. Thus Nietzsche’s “new desire — to lie still as a mirror,” and paradoxically to become “more unsure, tenderer, more fragile, more broken, but full of hopes that as yet have no name, full of new will and currents.” Rhythmically, this is expressed by syncopation. I wrote about syncopation at the end of 2011, even though, at the time, I didn’t realize that’s what it was:

A lot of people ask me why I insist on comparing Katy B to the Bee Gees, which somehow manages to insult everyone, no matter which artist they prefer. Well, you know how “Stayin’ Alive” creates that weird, fluid rhythmic space where no matter how you dance, you seem to be on the beat? Which was pretty much the best thing ever for people with my dancing skills? That same trick works over and over again on the Katy B album. Katy slows it down to a purr where the beat skitters and freaks out, and then she sings her lungs out while the beat stalls and fills with bass. The result is bigger than the space it is given, bigger than headphones, bigger than a warehouse.

Syncopation in fact co-evolves, at least in the West, with melodic techniques that are, themselves, kinds of mirrors. Here’s Number 13 from “The Art of Fugue,” by Johann Sebastian Bach:

Actually, it’s easier to see the involution here (the dance, dance, involution):

Those are merely examples of “chamber pop,” but the future of pop music is in syncopation, which is why I was so relieved to discover that Cassie hasn’t gone anywhere. She’s still around and is cooking up a new album.

In case you don’t remember Cassie, she’s the R&B singer who showed up in 2006 with “Me & U,” an attempt to distill Ciara, Beyonce, and Janet into the simplest terms possible. Even the title is all of four characters long. She moves and she doesn’t; she’s been waiting, and she’s thinking about making that move.

She went on hiatus, appearing (of course) in the dancing movie Step Up 2: The Streets, and releasing some generic, charming singles, including “Is It You?” and “Official Girl.” But now Cassie’s back for real with “King of Hearts,” backed up by a small army of other singles, most of which haven’t gotten much attention yet: “Make U A Believer,” “Balcony” with Jeezy, and “Let’s Get Crazy” with Akon. I found out she was back when Pitchfork added the Richard X remix of “King of Hearts” to their list of best new songs.

Forget the remix, though. Like Kanye West’s own remix of “King of Hearts,” it’s an attempt to control and standardize Cassie, who is otherwise a force of nature. Richard X inserts the steady hum of an outboard motor, and so robs the song of that crucial, breathless wobble.

In 2005, her album cover made her look like a pop star from 1986; now, in 2012, she’s embracing a hairstyle from the proud Black fashions of the early 1990s, paired with clothes from the late Sixties. Rihanna, of all people, is copying her. Cassie strikes me as really, truly, off the wall. But that could be reading way too much into some pieces of dance music. I mean, it’s not like she’s dancing in front of a mirror, or something.

When you left them back on the farm
For the city at dawn
The drone of the young and the hum
Of the pretty were songs
You thought you’d never forget
It’s a pity they’re gone

When the sun goes down and the moon appears
You go looking for love in the hall of mirrors


a really short blog post about camp

[Beginning in] the 1970s, the real is the impossible, most frequently manifesting in Lacan’s axiomatic declaration of the impossibility of a sexual relationship [...] Men and women swerve away from the impossibility of their relationship.
-Reinhard, Zizek, Santner. The Neighbor. (I sometimes call it “a pretty amazing series of arguments, considering I know at least two of them to be married.”)

***

So, erstwhile delinquent and talented journalist Dan D’Addario recently wrote this article, predicting quite insightfully that Smash would be both classy and dreary at the same time. (I still watch it, but it’s starting to give me The Vague Sads.)

D’Addario’s point is that in an era of greater visibility and equality for gay individuals — progress, albeit progress under considerable threat — the fundamental method of camp, which was the daring implication of queer love or identity, no longer exerts the same force. When a “gay aesthetic” is completely mainstream, thanks to Smash, Glee, and a million other bits and pieces (e.g. Modern Family, Lady Gaga), what’s left to wink about?

Then this sentence caught my eye: “Camp is borne [sic] of passion, but it’s generally misplaced passion. The creators of camp spectacles are generally the last ones in on the joke.”

If you’re like me, there’s one person whom that describes better than anyone else in the universe: Tommy Wiseau, director of The Room. The Room is still the campiest thing around, and it’s homoerotic at many points, but it’s also absurdly heteronormative (or, at least, it really tries to be). There are sex scenes that go on for what seems like 20 minutes, including significant amounts of recycled footage, which Wiseau seems to believe no-one will ever notice.

We’re talking utterly gratuitous nudity, gestures done seemingly in slow-motion, terrifying pseudo-porn humping, deflowered roses, a rainstorm that hurries over from Saturn, Wiseau’s vampire-white skin and steroidal muscles, and even a scene of inexplicable implied voyeurism. It has to be seen to be believed.

I won’t go on at length here, because it’s a great movie that’s already gotten tons of press during its second life as a “cult classic.” (Wiseau hosts screenings regularly, still as if totally unaware of the reason why his film is so popular.) The point is this: the new epicenter of camp is not queer desire but hetero desire, carried out in a perfectly conventional way, with utter earnestness. On top of all of Wiseau’s scenes, there’s another couple who have sex in Wiseau’s house, and then have to retrieve their underwear in front of his mother. The other things that I’d call campy in The Room are football, friendship, coffee, and mobsters. There’s no apple pie in the film, but you could probably argue that apple pie had already turned campy with the premiere of the first American Pie movie. (If you won’t…I will!) In fact, American Pie even made camp itself campy by introducing all of us to Allyson Hannigan’s “band camp” story.

Camp used to be about the possibility of openly queer love, a possibility that never completely goes away or gutters out: maybe if we were in a different room, a different neighborhood or nation; maybe if we had been born at a later date; maybe if we had met each other a few years earlier or later; maybe if nobody finds out, or if the cover story’s good enough. Now, in 2012, the formal features of camp are the same, but the poles are reversed. It’s no longer about the possibility of a “shameful” love. Modern camp is Zizek doing Sondheim. It is about the impossibility of “normal” passion. We find ourselves laughing at the vacuum that befalls love when it is bereft of shame.

The Social Netflix

Dear readers,

No matter what I’m doing, whether I’m being social, or working, or procrastinating, or flirting, I’m rarely all that far away from a screen. That’s particularly true now that I’ve got an iPad. While I look forward to writing more about books and movies eventually, it seems natural to blog about how we use technology at this moment when everything is being mediated in new ways by technology that, within recent memory, simply didn’t exist.

Take, for example, Netflix. I’ve been using it for about a decade, with only infrequent interruptions. Right now, it’s going through such a painful adolescence that we may be about to break up, though I’ll be back once Netflix gets the agreements from the film industry that it so clearly deserves. How we use Netflix says an enormous amount about what is working, and what isn’t, as we try to adapt to the “state of leisure” in the 21st Century.

It’s clear where we’re headed: movie theaters will continue to grow larger and more immersive, because that’s the only thing they can do that people can’t duplicate at home. They will also keep getting more expensive, until going to see a movie will be roughly akin to the way, right now, some people infrequently go to the (live) theater. Meanwhile, all kinds of media, from television shows to blockbuster films, will be available on-demand at home, and you will decide whether to pay a flat fee or watch commercials.

That raises two questions: Are we there yet? What will this golden age of media feel like?

ARE WE THERE YET?

We’re definitely not there yet, and the road there is starting to get pretty frustrating. Netflix can’t get the streaming agreements it needs from the major studios, partly (I think) because of pre-existing agreements with premium cable channels like Cinemax. As a result, you never really know what Netflix is going to have, and what it isn’t. Netflix intentionally makes it hard to figure out if a film in your queue is going to disappear, so I constantly find myself ready to watch a certain film, only to learn that it has vanished. Initially, of course, I responded by watching films frantically, but at this point my reaction is one of diffidence. Even with films I really want to see, like Winter’s Bone, I find myself saying “maybe I’ll watch it, and maybe I won’t.” In other words, this complex state of uncertainty devalues films.

Apple is overpriced, but that would be OK if it had everything. It doesn’t.

Accessing popular films isn’t particularly difficult: you can rent them from Redbox kiosks, you can pirate them, you can pay to watch them legally. But there’s no good way to watch classic or foreign films other than a Netflix DVD subscription, and that’s problematic for reasons I’ll discuss below.

Meanwhile, the situation with TV shows is just horrible. Season 4 of Damages exists, but you’ll have to pirate it or watch it on DirecTV, if you are one of their indentured consumers. Hulu+ was supposed to be a great solution for the home and for mobile devices, but the industry keeps denying mobile access to its shows, and playing hide-and-seek with what Hulu maintains for any given show. Plus, it has tons of commercials, and you’re paying to watch them.

In a world where you can purchase most any song ever recorded from iTunes, or stream virtually anything via Spotify/Rdio/etc., this constipated state of video delivery makes no sense. I don’t care what business agreements are holding us back — I’m not going to play the game of pretending I’m in the film industry, making the hard decisions, or the game of siding with one company (Apple, for example) against another (HBO, for example). Right now they all suck.

WHAT WILL THE FUTURE BE LIKE?

I can tell you what I’m hoping for. I’m hoping that, in the future, people will watch lots of movies and television shows in their odd off hours, and that they’ll post ideas about what they’ve seen to various social networks.

I’m not really expecting that streaming video will have an impact on live social interactions, because the accessibility of visual media has turned out to be a social curse. Just this summer, I was involved in at least fifty conversations, few of which I initiated, about whether a given person should watch a given movie or TV show. As Portlandia (a great show that you should watch) demonstrated in one memorable skit, we all feel vaguely anxious about *not* watching the important stuff, and at the same time, we realize that watching it all is impossible.

Therefore, what you watch really depends on what kinds of Freudian neuroses you keep in your hip pocket. Are you hung up on masculinity? Well, then, I recommend Mad Men, Sons of Anarchy, and Breaking Bad. On sex? True Blood and Californication. On work? Nurse Jackie and (again) Mad Men, and maybe Damages or Suits. On snark? 30 Rock and Community. On adolescence? Pretty Little Liars, The Vampire Diaries, and maybe Gossip Girl. How about sentiment? Friday Night Lights and Modern Family. But even within these broad categories, individuals differ, and so much about what we take from these shows is difficult to express. The same goes for films, everything from The Social Network to Crazy Stupid Love. Personally, I thought Midnight in Paris was much less interesting than Vicky Cristina Barcelona, also by Woody Allen, but because people like movies that imply a free introductory lecture on Gertrude Stein, I’m not going to win that fight.

Furthermore, a lot of these conversations about what to watch are examples of accidental bad faith. The people involved may not really intend to watch the film or show — in fact, they’re looking for reasons not to do so, because they sense that this film won’t allow them to spend a blissful two hours re-tracing the maze of their own psyche. The fact that the conversation is happening at all is mostly just a symptom of anxiety.

The remaining technological hurdles make all of this worse. Since you never know what exactly will be showing on Netflix streaming, it often devolves into a glorified version of channel surfing. God forbid you find yourself hanging out with somebody on the 3 DVD plan, desperately trying to figure out which of their 2 or 3 movies to watch. I’ve also spent countless hours transferring stuff to friends, and even to myself, on flash drives, because “the cloud” is not, as yet, really up and running.

Because media is accessible, and because we worry about it, the days of treasuring a film with a whole group of people seem to be coming to an end. I used to get together with friends to watch The Big Lebowski for the nth time, partly because it’s a great movie, and partly because renting movies was a pain. Now, you get those same friends together, and I guarantee they’ll be worried sick about whether or not to watch Blue Valentine.

The wonderful, important conversations that we have about films and television shows happen after “THE END,” if they happen at all. Yet most often, when I make plans to see movies with folks, there’s no time at the end of the movie to let it seep in, and to discuss it. That’s the point when everyone’s most exhausted, and if there’s a journey to make to get home, going home takes priority. That’s where the Internet comes in so handy — seeing, via one of our feeds, what a friend felt after they were done watching The King’s Speech. Maybe they were speechless — if so, they’ll brighten the feed another day.

That reminds me. I still haven’t seen that movie about the stuttering king. I gotta go.

-Kugelmass

Whedon’s Dollhouse: My Theory Is That It’s All Real

Antisocial personality disorder is characterized by at least 3 of the following:
Callous unconcern for the feelings of others and lack of the capacity for empathy.
Gross and persistent attitude of irresponsibility and disregard for social norms, rules, and obligations.
Incapacity to maintain enduring relationships.
Very low tolerance to frustration and a low threshold for discharge of aggression, including violence.
Incapacity to experience guilt and to profit from experience, particularly punishment.
Markedly prone to blame others or to offer plausible rationalizations for the behavior bringing the subject into conflict.
Persistent irritability.

-Wikipedia

Well, Dollhouse came and went. If you ask me, it probably should have run for three seasons instead of two, because the second season felt extremely rushed. There were some interesting ideas, such as the “Whiskey” character, that didn’t get fully explored, and the apocalyptic futurescape turned into more sketch than setting.

That said, even in the best of all possible worlds, Dollhouse couldn’t have lasted too long. (Well, actually, in the best of all possible worlds, the show wouldn’t exist at all, but that’s another story.) Its premise simply went nuclear too quickly — by the end of the first season, it was clear that Whedon was going as fast as possible from a story about a brothel of the brainwashed to a story about cyberpunks saving humanity. For many fans, this was the meaning of the series and the heart of the story. A lot of the stuff at the beginning, goes the now-familiar narrative, was merely put there by FOX to attract non-Whedon-obsessed viewers.

In addition, much of the casual conversations on the Web and elsewhere about Dollhouse emphasized basically practical questions about the technology in the show. For example, an Amazon reviewer named Phoenix Child (and, seriously, let’s all hope that’s his or her real name) wrote:

At once a dark and disturbing show, “Dollhouse” was a difficult television show to watch because it challenged its viewers, it questioned its viewers: is it possible to erase someone’s soul? Is it morally right to have such technology? Is it human nature to abuse this technology? If the dolls are all ostensibly volunteers, is there such a thing as voluntary servitude or are the engagements prostitution of a most profoundly perverted nature?

None of these are actually difficult questions, though Phoenix Child presents them that way. Is it possible to erase someone’s soul? No, although accidental or deliberate brain damage (i.e. lobotomies) can also damage personhood. Is it morally right to have such technology? No. If this technology existed, would it be abused? Yes. If the dolls are all ostensibly volunteers, does that make what’s happening OK? No.

In other words, as with Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World, the meaning of Dollhouse becomes profoundly shallow if it is reduced to practical questions about which technologies do or do not already exist. Huxley wasn’t warning us about a possible future state of the world — he was critiquing the world in which he lived. Likewise, in order to understand Whedon’s show, we have to see all the events as relating metaphorically to our present state of being.

Considered from this perspective, the show is actually about how much of our sense of identity is derived from our work. It suggests that the fundamental desire of our employers, qua employers, is to colonize our entire identity. This is more than a matter of working long hours. As Barbara Ehrenreich noted in Nickel and Dimed, employment questionnaires for big box stores like Wal-Mart ask potential employees questions about their mood, including questions based on psychiatric indicators of depression. Many — perhaps most — hiring policies revolve as much around intangibles of character as they do around required skills: “We’re looking for energetic, smiling people to become part of the team!”

I am not suggesting here that we should automatically resent all such overlaps of the personal and the professional. Would I really want Barack Obama to think of his presidency as entirely separate from his personhood? Of course not; being President takes character. Dollhouse isn’t saying this either. Rather, it’s a literalization of the idea that as we perform an increasing number of diverse roles, it is harder and harder to reconcile the various potential selves that become actual through those roles. An exhausting cognitive dissonance sets in, made worse by the fact that very often, we both like who we are and who we used to be. Everyone was a little different in college or high school, but it’s disorienting to change habits, lifestyles, and crowds every few years. Echo becomes a superhero in the Whedonverse because she can survive consciously containing multitudes without turning into a sociopath.

From here, it’s easy to see why Whedon wanted to include “remote imprinting.” He’s making a point about identity, and he doesn’t want to leave out the fact that our identities are affected by media (the ever-popular deadly cellphone “wipe,” a metaphor for the little revolutions cellphones have initiated) and culture (naturally, boom boxes can broadcast soul-killing frequencies, Whedon’s way of commenting on Top 40 radio). He cleverly uses the biological term, “imprinting,” to suggest that we go about our lives in a somewhat infantile state, imitating a constantly changing set of stereotyped models for how we should think and act. When, at the end of the show, Topher annihilates the imprinting technology, everyone except the superheroes is left in a daze, no longer slaves, but not really anything else either.

Still, this doesn’t solve the problem of Echo. One could easily argue that she never becomes sociopathic because, in a world where people are being destroyed by a single evil technology, the moral imperatives are so clear that one’s place is always easy to determine. The world becomes simple. It is easy to see that, for example, switching bodies by overwriting other personalities is wrong. It’s not so easy to guess what is correct when it comes to overwriting ourselves: have you ever seen a yoga teacher who didn’t look and dress like a yoga teacher? Or an academic who didn’t strike you as an academic? One makes jokes about academics wearing elbow patches precisely to be reassured that if you don’t have them on your elbows, you aren’t already wearing a uniform.

If you replace the heavy emphasis on violent aggression with its lesser cousins, irritability and frustration, it is easy to see how troubling the definition of sociopathy becomes. “Incapacity to experience guilt and to profit from experience, particularly punishment” — well, if your situation is in a constant state of flux, it can be hard to apply the lessons of experience, and holding onto guilt is ridiculous. “Incapacity to maintain enduring relationships” — or, We Really Need Facebook Very Badly. “Markedly prone to blame others or to offer plausible rationalizations for the behavior bringing the subject into conflict” — the key being plausibility, which, given the rich technologies we now possess for writing our own narratives, is a commodity everyone can afford, and a screen that not much penetrates. Much of the definition of sociopathy relies, implicitly, on a continuity of community that no longer exists. More troubling still, understanding based on recognizing another person’s models does not bring empathy along with it. If I know a certain hipster is trying to be Julian Casablancas, I feel icily aware of what he is doing, instead of being warmed by his earnest love for all that the Strokes represent. The more I flatter his sensibility by talking about the (real) virtues of garage rock, the more I feel as though I’m watching the conversation from behind a one-way mirror. That is why it becomes so important for Whedon’s dolls, and for most of the people around them, not to know or to forget that imprinting is taking place.

At the end of the show, Echo is alive, but her lover Paul Ballard is not. Fortunately, she has uploaded his personality to disk, and she downloads him into her own brain so that their affair can continue. If he were alive, and prone to the shattering accidents of a separate and real existence, could they ever be so wonderfully together, so thrillingly united? Echo is smiling. But her eyes are closed.

In Which Our Hero Resolves The Question of Nature vs. Nurture

(x-posted to The Valve, of course)

Nature versus nurture, Lodge. Nature always wins.
–Secretary William Cleary, Wedding Crashers

Jenny Davidson’s new book of cultural criticism, entitled Breeding: A Partial History of the Eighteenth Century, is one of the strangest and most elliptical works of its kind I’ve ever read. I say this because, unlike traditional works of historicist criticism, Breeding never makes an overt argument about how modern readers should feel about its subject, the nature vs. nurture debates of the 18th Century. It risks seeming purposeless in order to pit Steven Pinker, a contemporary researcher and author on matters of cognition and evolution, against William Godwin, a pedagogue and Romantic who died in 1836. This fundamental comparison seems to be more an effect of the text than something Davidson consciously intended; she spells out her intentions in the Introduction, citing W. G. Sebald and Roland Barthes as inspirations for a text that seeks only to explore the “grid” of an issue and to present its nuances in a tolerant, dispassionate fashion.

In so doing, however, the text is bound to leave us mildly disappointed. It is not that it lacks erudition or insight; in fact, as the great diversity of responses published on the Valve indicates, its plentiful supply of both encourages readers to enter this debate as one might a house preserved from that time, lingering over those artifacts that they, for their own reasons, find most compelling. But I think that, even despite ourselves, we come to a book like Breeding in the hopes that we might end up a little closer to answering those same raw and troubling questions that inspired Locke and Rousseau. That remains, in this case, the road not taken. Still, Davidson’s book suggests, if only by what it chooses to include, some important ways of cutting the Gordian knot of nature and nurture.

***

Davidson claims that the uncertainty produced by the tension between nature and nurture is morally ideal. She writes in the conclusion to the book that “a hard-core commitment to nature-based explanation, a hard-core advocacy of nurture” are both likely to make us, in Godwin’s words, “the helpless victims of a blind and remorseless destiny” (205). The real problem with having a destiny of this kind is that it enables us to be summed up by the controlling forces of society: if society knows exactly who we are, either because of our inborn nature or because of how it has formed us, than it can legitimately claim the right to act on that knowledge, effectively depriving us of our freedom. To this end, Davidson revisits not only the intertwined histories of racism and eugenics, but also quotes Mary Midgley on the necessary limits of nurture: “If we were genuinely plastic and indeterminate at birth, there could be no reason why society should not stamp us into any shape that might suit it” (7).

Over the course of the book, Davidson presents Godwin as a zealous pedagogue who started out believing entirely in “nurture,” but who eventually had to confront the limits of his own theories:

Yet Political Justice‘s uncompromising position on the natural equality of men would be modified by Godwin in subsequent editions of the book, a retraction that speaks to Godwin’s intellectual honesty in the face of his experience as an educator of real children (as opposed to a pure theorist of education). (174)

Davidson continues, after quoting Godwin at length:

The irony is that Godwin should have been so perfectly positioned to see and to articulate the workings of hereditary causes in spite of–because of?–his early adherence to an extreme Helvetian position. In the end, he argues for balance [...] Man “brings a certain character into the world with him,” but not “an immutable character,” although elsewhere in the same collection an older position resurfaces.” (178)

Steven Pinker, by contrast, is the modern academic researcher who never exposes himself to the rough winds of doubt, and who is therefore guilty of resorting to “what seems like intellectual bullying” (40) in support of a heavily deterministic, evolutionary interpretation of human nature and culture, one that even “many of his professional peers are inclined to question” (39). Pinker epitomizes the “hard-core commitment to nature-based explanation” that ultimately puts our personal freedoms in danger.

This is, by now, familiar territory for scholarship in the humanities, as both John Holbo and Miriam Burstein have pointed out. Davidson presents herself as a moderate, championing an ongoing process of inquiry as well as the habit of wary scepticism that sustains it. (Pinker, by contrast, calls himself a moderate but is no such thing.) Such an attitude, her text promises, is both a means of potentially making ourselves better than we currently are, and an antidote to dangerous political enthusiasms.

I hope that I will not give offense by describing such an approach, with its focus on self-improvement and gradualism, as comfortably bourgeois, in the same sense in which we might usefully apply the term to both Barthes and Sebald. (After all, Sebald, in the indictment of a very poor meal that Davidson quotes, is not only preparing the way for his description of starving refugee children; he is also railing against frozen seafood and mass-produced tartar sauce.) In writing about our determination to be “better than we once were” (201, quoting John Passmore), Davidson calls New Year’s resolutions to mind, as well our desire to exercise more, to criticize the action rather than the person, to take piano lessons, and to finally itemize our household expenses. (In the context, one wants to ask: do not even the publicans the same?) It is closer than necessary to the slippery pseudo-critiques of American society in Malcolm Gladwell and Freakonomics, many of which reduce down to new versions of old self-help truisms. Politically, it is once again the French Revolution as seen from the perspective of English aristocrats who felt the Terror, and the Napoleonic threat, rather more keenly than the horrors of monarchy or empire.

At the same time, Davidson’s book is potentially much better than its excessively determined beginning and end. In her illuminating discussions of Shakespeare, Defoe, Rousseau, and others, she paves the way for a transformation of the debate over nature and nurture into a conversation about the role of art and imagination in the constitution of the individual, and the importance of defending an imaginative, singular Gestalt against the totalizing claims of reason. Davidson spends considerable time on the popular belief that what women imagined during conception and pregnancy influenced the appearance and nature of the child. She mentions twice that women could bear a child who resembled their husband if they pictured the husband while committing adultery. This led to the unintentionally hilarious theory that “resemblance might be brought about because the mother, lying her lover’s arms, feared discovery by her real husband” (23) and therefore practiced a kind of exculpatory visualization exercise.

This seems like a fairly obvious case of reversal, especially considering how that paradigm has evolved up to the present: the real fear is not that the woman will be thinking of her husband while making it with the matador, but rather that she will be thinking of another man while having sex with her husband. Out of this comes all the scenes in modern comedies and soap operas where a lover shouts out the wrong name in the heat of passion, or somebody confesses to “Thinking of you / in the final throes,” as Amy Winehouse puts it. What is terrifying is that the sexual act, which is supposed to produce a merging of subjectivities, cannot banish the stubbornly personal and solitary nature of the imagination. Furthermore, it is the imagination that makes sense of the present through reference to the past, literally putting its “stamp” on an individual’s perceptions in the same way that the parent’s visage stamps the child. The concept of the association of ideas, which was so central to both Locke and Godwin, leads us to analyze the synthetic processes at work in such phenomena as dreams — it leads us, in other words, toward a Freudian understanding of individuality.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, we see imagination and reason divided along gendered lines, with the personal accidents of the feminine imagination always figured as a threat to or disfigurement of the perfect, rational male mind, and the correspondingly perfect body. It is especially noteworthy that desire and trauma, which so heavily determine the gap between ourselves and others, are always the points of reference for inherited characteristics. In addition to the anxieties about adultery, “a desire for strawberries might produce a strawberry birthmark” (21), and “the sight of a mutilated beggar [might produce] a child with missing limbs.” The list of traumas expands to include a child whose ear bears the mark of her father’s dueling injury, and a lamb with wool affected by its mother’s once-broken leg.

What may appear to be unscientific fairy stories touch unexpectedly on truths: children are very much subject to the traumas their parents have experienced, both as individual people and as a couple, and they are also subject to the fantasies, superstitions, and other constructs upon which the adults nearest to them depend. This remains a source of great anxiety, as we see in a story like Henry James’s The Turn of the Screw, about the suffocating hold of a governess’s imagination over her two charges. On a larger scale, in both The Idiot and The Brothers Karamazov, we see Dostoevsky driven to distraction by the persistence of superstitions and cults that almost sanction insanity, and which are passed down from one generation to the next. But mixed in with this reasonable complaint, one senses, in this contempt for the impressionable and disordered female mind, an intolerant attitude towards the contingent elements in sensibility and subjective perceptions, because these contingencies produce heterogeneous, ungovernable subjects.

It is unfortunate that a book that deals so freely with the “erotic investments” of Rousseau and the sexual anxieties of Swift, Godwin, Malthus and others should dismiss Freud in a single paragraph:

Rousseau’s discussion would find a famous sequel in Freud’s contention “that what we call our civilization is largely responsible for our misery, and that we should be much happier if we gave it up and returned to primitive conditions.” But all such arguments hinge on a foundational act of self-deception or self-contradiction in which the writer only pretends to abnegate a culture on which he depends, however much he may deplore it. (120)

This reading of Rousseau and Civilization and Its Discontents reduces all people to helplessness in the face of whatever happens to be their inherited culture and circumstances. It is anti-literary and perhaps even anti-intellectual in its implications. It is difficult to see why Rousseau’s noble savage should be denied the tolerant attitude Davidson adopts towards Jonathan Swift’s fantastical backdrops for social criticism. The very act of going back to the eighteenth century, and imagining oneself to be observing the impact of dealing with unruly children on William Godwin, is an enabling fiction for historical scholarship. Furthermore, any act of repentance is necessarily an act of self-contradiction, which is why Friedrich Nietzsche opposed such attitudes on logical grounds — to strive for perfection, as Davidson wishes us to do, is to stand in contradiction to one’s own history and past choices. Rousseau and Freud are neither more nor less “counterfactual” than she herself wishes to be.

Rather than dismissing a “return to the state of Nature” as a mere impossibility, it seems to me that we can usefully read Rousseau as advocating encounters with Nature in a manner that must, now as then, be deliberately arranged. If we want to have an experience of wildness, we have to arrange time off from work, and we usually have to drive or fly quite a distance, almost as though there were indeed a “deficiency [of Nature's reach or presence] that cannot by definition be anything but an accident and a deviation from Nature” (115, quoting Derrida). Derrida’s attempts to “disprove” the loss of the natural environment lead to what is, I would argue, a very serious misreading of Rousseau’s passage on men “accustomed from childhood to the inclemencies of the weather, and the rigor of the seasons, hardened to fatigue, and forced to defend naked and unarmed their life and their Prey [...] [who thereby] develop a robust and almost unalterable temperament” that their children come to share. Davidson describes this as the judicious strengthening of “a constitution or temperament [...] by culture” (117), which is simply too reductive. If it is part of one’s culture to consume large amounts of green tea, it is nonetheless not the culture that actually reduces the propensity of one’s cells to form cancerous tumors. It is still the compounds in the tea. I say this because of the inclination to discredit everything Rousseau is saying about Nature by linking it to matters of preference and habit that apply equally to other ideologies, as though the content of the encounter itself was therefore rendered irrelevant.

If we think of Freud and Rousseau as proposing encounters of a certain salutary kind — with the traumatic past and with the bracing impersonality and grandeur of Nature, respectively — then it is not so hard to see them as akin to us in their pursuit of perfection, or rather, to see their stamp upon our own endeavors. In all cases it falls to the individual to bring into harmony that which is contradictory and unresolved in her own experience: the country and the city, the past and the present, theory and practice. We do not know what combination of bitter experience and inbred melancholy produces a Swift, but both are encompassed and transcended by the creative triumph of his work, which he leaves behind as his legacy. (Nor do we know the proportions of myopia and gentleness in the visions of Monet.) Because we have Swift, and Sylvia Plath, and the Sex Pistols, and de Sade, and the rest, we can say, like Fuckhead in Jesus’ Son, “All these…weirdos, and me…getting a little better every day. I had never known…I had never imagined even for a heartbeat that…there might be a place in the world for people like us.” But the search for that place, or rather the heterotopia of many such places, still puts us violently at odds with the general drift of the society, still strands us in the hope that such personal visions, sealed up inside of art, can be awoken into a real and common life.

Good Paulina, lead us from hence,
Where we may leisurely
Each one demand and answer to his part
Performed in this wide gap of time since first
We were dissevered. Hastily lead away.

–William Shakespeare, The Winter’s Tale

Those Obscene Octuplets

(x-posted to The Valve)

Greetings from California, where, as is now very widely known, people do crazy things with the help of doctors, up to and including giving birth to children 7 through 14 at the same time.

Since most people’s interest in the Guinness Book of World Records begins to wane by age 11, it’s surprising to me that the Suleman octuplets have created such an enormous scandal. They are an inescapable subject across completely different workplaces, social settings, and social classes. The story has been told by nearly everyone, major media included, in an emotional register that goes all the way from outrage to very angry mockery.

How will she (Nadya) pay for the family? Why is she so “obsessed” with having children? Why would she have more children if it meant that her mother would speak disapprovingly of her? Why would a doctor assist with the process, despite having taken some kind of Greek oath early on? Where’s Dad?

At first, this story struck me as merely another case of something small getting a lot of media time, a category that also includes sensational murders and descriptions of how the First Family relaxes. That was my initial reaction; as I continued to bump into the story again and again, I was struck by the fact that it is really obscene, in the sense of an event or practice that attracts hatred and disgust exceeding any legitimate objection. Suleman certainly strikes me as foolish, but why does her decision strike so many Americans as obscene?

***

The simplest answer is that she is bringing a huge number of children into the world during an economic depression. Even though there is little evidence that Suleman is currently penniless, we worry for the future of all those children because right now the future seems bleak, period. The ur-mother becomes a source of anxiety, rather than a symbol of American vitality.

I think the meaning of the event goes deeper, though. Look at how Yahoo! News reported the story:

 

There were frozen embryos left over after her previous pregnancies and her daughter didn’t want them destroyed, so she decided to have more children.

Her mother and doctors have said the woman was told she had the option to abort some of the embryos and, later, the fetuses. She refused.

Her mother said she does not believe her daughter will have any more children.

“She doesn’t have any more (frozen embryos), so it’s over now,” she said. “It has to be.”

Suleman actually played by the rules of the anti-abortion movement. She treated each of her fertilized embryos as a human individual possessing a right to life, and refused to either destroy the embryos or abort the fetuses. The whole event was set in motion by a perfectly justifiable procedure — she couldn’t have had any children without medical help — and carried forward by an ideological way of interpreting fertilization and pregnancy that has nothing to do with such concerns as the whereabouts of the father, or her ability to pay her children’s expenses.

It doesn’t help that the anti-abortion movement thinks about conception in a rigidly naturalistic way, and therefore has practically no framework for dealing with the categorical disruptions implied by these “artificial” births. The great storm of public fury that has been kicked up by these octuplets is more than an annoyance at the water cooler. It is a vivid demonstration of the price that our country pays every day for the comforting moral clarity of the “right to life,” a fragile construct that has always been partly about not letting pregnant women “escape responsibility” for their actions. If a mother’s life goes to hell because she can’t afford to raise a child, well, she should have thought of that when she let herself get knocked up. The child becomes a sort of righteous punishment, not a person — and, in similar fashion, those “outraged” by Suleman’s story clearly hope that she (and, inevitably, her children) will have a rough time of it. It is the worship of motherhood, and the hatred of mothers.

What Doesn’t Kill You Makes You Stranger: Heath Ledger’s Joker

(x-posted to The Valve)

Dear readers, this is about the film The Dark Knight and will, of necessity, be crammed absolutely full of spoilers.

***

It seems we are still too close to The Dark Knight; we are reeling. The critics have generally rated the film very high, which is useful but not explanatory, and Heath Ledger’s performance as The Joker has already become legendary despite the fact that we don’t really know what is legendary about it. An attempted discussion at The Valve died out amidst cries that comic books are kids’ stuff (or maybe FASCIST!), and our friend Scott at Acephalous showed wonderful enthusiasm tinged with unmistakable vertigo. Some critics have compared the Joker to a wounded child who turned out bad (instead of turning out bat), which is wrong, and others have compared him to the Sex Pistols, which is pleasanter but still not quite right. There’s as much of the bum — the homeless, unemployed and mentally ill man for whom beatings have lost their meaning — in the Joker as there is the punk.

I’m going to start from the premise that Batman’s acting and psychology in this film aren’t very interesting. Christian Bale doesn’t get a chance to act, because neither playboys nor avengers get to feel much emotion, and he doesn’t develop because he did all that in the first movie. Instead, it’s the idea of Batman, the sum total of the things he represents, says, and does, that start the engine of the film — he is the fixed quantity, the “immovable object,” with which the Joker dances. Furthermore, the secondary plot of the film, involving Harvey Dent’s transformation into Two-Face, falls way short of Batman’s chemistry with the Joker. (This is partly due to Aaron Eckhart’s limitations as an actor, which are considerable. He appears to get his ideas for characters from their summaries on Wikipedia.) Thus everything revolves around the Joker. The film forces us to return to him obsessively.

In an interview with Fear.com, Ledger announced that he and Christopher Nolan had “the same idea” about the Joker, but refused to elaborate.

What is the meaning of what Ledger has left us?

***

I advise you to hire a poet.
-
Mephistopheles in Goethe’s Faust

First, it must be said that the Joker is much, much smarter than Batman. Not only does he guess every move that Batman will make throughout the film, adjusting his own actions accordingly, but he shatters the fundamental assumption of any superhero film, which is that superheroes don’t kill supervillains because they (the heroes) are finally so dominant that they have the luxury of mercy. In The Dark Knight, Batman doesn’t kill The Joker because the nature of the separation between the Joker and himself is just too tenuous, and he has to enforce that separation by refusing to kill. The Joker happily calls his bluff, leading to three scenes where The Joker wins by showing no concern for his own life (four if you count the grenades in his jacket).

The reverse is also true, though — The Joker can’t kill Batman, because, he says, “you’re just too much fun.” That’s what we have to understand first before we can pick up on Ledger’s mannerisms and bizarre intonations. The Joker feels about Batman the way Shakespeare might feel if performances of Hamlet were being blocked in court by Thomas Kyd. In the previous film, Batman has taken the crucial plunge by deciding that his own personal neuroses have a global significance and relate in some meaningful way to the ebb and flow of order (law) and chaos (crime) in Gotham City. As a result, the whole city of Gotham has to play along with Batman, pretending as though shining the Bat Signal into the clouds and having one man karate chop his way around the city is the best way to fight crime. Being Batman is an incredibly excessive, libidinal kinkiness, but it is also a sort of splendor, without which the impetus to fight crime is lacking. It may seem ridiculous to assert that we have to let people dress up as sleeker versions of furries in order to persuade them to wield the baton, but in truth The Dark Knight is just illuminating the fantasies that play themselves out more tamely in normal professional lives. The Joker understands this so well that he’s out to climb the ladder and throw it away, by which I mean that he wants to turn the battle between criminals and vigilantes into a non-stop morality spectacular in which every normal ferry trip becomes a live, game show version of the prisoner’s dilemma. His polymorphous perversity is an end run around Batman’s incompletely sublimated fantasies. It’s not necessarily disappointing to him that the people on the ferries don’t detonate each other — I mean, isn’t that wonderful? They got to prove they were good people — Eichmann on the one boat, Bigger Thomas on the other. The Joker claps when Gary Oldman is made commissioner, perfectly well aware that this scene of goodness rewarded is only possible because he (the Joker) killed Commissioner #1. Ladies and gentleman, we are tonight’s entertainment.

That’s why it’s ridiculous to criticize The Dark Knight on the grounds that it is a children’s film or infantile; it is about infantility, and raises questions about how much we can really escape from apparently embarrassing wishes. Part of the problem with a fiction like Enchanted or Harry Potter is that it allows adults to feel themselves at a safe distance from kids’ stuff through (respectively) ironic misdirection and misty, head-patting sentimentality.

Insofar as we can untangle the Joker, the story goes something like this: It is the nature of the self to be melancholic, and thus to long for a return to a critical point of origin, which, if lost, would leave a void threatened by madness. As a result, the individual tries to go back to a point of origin that he has (for all practical purposes) invented, lacerating himself in the process, and so actually becoming the scarred, exiled creature. At the same time, the individual, despite his scars, gradually is able to come closer to the illusion of being identical with his fantasy. Of course, ceasing to distinguish between oneself and the fantasy is also madness: when Batman takes off his mask, he is Bruce Wayne, whereas when the Joker takes off his clown mask at the end of the bank robbery, he is still a clown. The main thing enabling Batman to remain both people without a psychotic breakdown is the Janus figure of the gatekeeper, Alfred, whose two-facedness in this film (part butler, part CIA scorched-earth man) earns him the name in all its fullness.

The role of time in this psychological process is pretty confusing, but there are lots of examples that can help us see our way forward. For example, in the film Fight Club, Edward Norton’s character Jack is trying to recover the manhood that he’s lost to consumerism and the working week. This desire splits off into a persona of its own, named Tyler Durden, who Jack imagines to be Brad Pitt. In order to be Tyler Durden, and thus to recover his own primordial self, Jack has to put himself through physical ordeals (mostly savage fistfights) that smash him (and his life) to pieces but make the Durden aspect of his personality, still represented as an unharmed Adonis, more and more totalizing. In The Dark Knight, the Joker shows up at a meeting of crime bosses from whom he has just stolen $68 million. One of them asks “Give me one reason why I shouldn’t have [my henchman] tear your head off,” to which the Joker replies, “How about a magic trick? I will make this pencil disappear.” The Joker makes the pencil disappear when the henchman moves towards him — the Joker slams the man’s head against a table, killing him instantly when the pencil slices through his head. In other words, the conversation about why the Joker shouldn’t be assaulted happens as the assault is actually being attempted and then foiled: the two things are one and the same, except for the split between the logic of insanity (the Joker as Adrian Brody’s pianist, performing at gunpoint) and practical thinking (the Joker defends himself against an immanent threat). The fantasy of innocent “magic tricks” is realized at the precise moment when it has utterly failed and been replaced by calculating violence. It is a version of what characters experience in Jean Genet’s novels: when the drag queen gains enough aesthetic sense to become, at last, an elegant jeune fille, he is a middle-aged man. When Harvey Dent truly becomes Gotham’s patron saint, he is a dead murderer.

The Joker would like to be completely mad, and so feel no cognitive dissonance at all; when he is accused of being mad, and replies “I’m not — no, I’m not,” his voice is heavy with regret. Even the stories that he tells to Gamble and Dawes are lucid in their very ridiculousness. Consider the story he tells to Gamble: while his father is beating up his mother, the mother defends herself with a kitchen knife, which then inexplicably causes the father to take the kitchen knife and begin ritually carving up his son’s face. What is supposed to be a story about torture and abuse turns into a story about the envy of the excluded: the little boy re-writes the story to make himself the center of attention, introducing a twist that has its own horrible fascination but actually doesn’t “fit.” This is precisely what Batman has done — turn the selfless work of upholding the law into a spectator sport with him in the middle. The second story not only features the Joker scarring his own face rather than trying to undo the damage to his wife’s face, but involves the Joker getting what are clearly external scars by sloshing a razor around inside his mouth. The union of the internal and the external is what Batman wants out of fighting crime, at Hancock-like cost to those around him.

***

In the first film, Batman fought human agents of totalitarian order; here, he fights an anarchist in love with the fireworks of chaos and the excesses of image. My sincere hope for the final installment is that Batman will face off against something inhuman, by which I certainly do not mean campy monsters. It seems to me that the inhuman is also the best possible lead-in for Batman’s conflicted relationship with the person who shares his denatured humanity — Catwoman, invoked slyly here by petitpoussin. (Nobody, as petitpoussin correctly observes, has been able to bring any life to Rachel Dawes.)

That said, what we make of Nolan’s trilogy will be greatly affected by whether we continue to overvalue films like Iron Man. Jean Baudrillard once wrote that Disneyland existed to make Americans believe that the rest of America was real; by the same token, risk-free parables like Iron Man and Harry Potter, towards which we feel genial disbelief, disguise from us the fantastic chimeras that dominate our real lives, and which comprise the glistening heart of The Dark Knight. I mean our dreams, our wishes, our nightmares, our faiths. It is because we are having trouble dealing with Ledger’s Mephistopheles, his tongue snaking around his lips, that we hear so many empty words about his “great performance” in a genre where “the movie is only as good as its villain.” Nolan thinks we deserve a better class of superhero movie: not the kind we need to preserve us in our delusions, but the kind we deserve.

A Little Something You Can Touch: HBO’s Wire and the Politics of Visual Media

(x-posted to The Valve)

Spend some on a little something you can touch. A new car, a new coat…it’s why we get up in the morning.
-The Greek

You want it to be one way, but it’s the other way.
-
Marlo

Talking about The Wire, which most of the people I know do twice per day, is like repeating a mantra: Season 1 is the police station. Season 2 is the docks. Season 3 is the streets (or, more inaccurately, “politics”). Season 4 is public schools. Season 5 is the press — I haven’t even seen Season 5, but I must’ve heard that six times already. People talk about each season as though they were separate reports from the President’s Council: “Have you started Season 5 yet? Wait, you didn’t see Season 2?” The show’s schematic design encourages people to talk about it in ways usually reserved for non-fiction, with an emphasis on its structural critiques of one poorer-than-average city (Baltimore), and maybe a comment in passing about the show’s brilliant detective/fuck-up in residence, McNulty.

Yes, McNulty’s no angel, but the terms of the discussion are themselves interesting and relevant to the perspective of the show’s writers. The Wire, unlike (for example) The Sopranos and Six Feet Under, is a show written almost entirely from outside the consciousness of its characters. Whereas, in the case of Tony Soprano or Claire Fisher, we felt their highs and lows, inhabited their dreams, and saw how their psychic lives bled into reality, The Wire keeps its distance from the cast, and does a good job of representing the systems that contain them. This (not the pseudo-philosophy of Ayn Rand) ought properly to be called the new objectivism, and it is a sign of the increasing dominance of visual representation (e.g. the television serial) as well as of a certain form of functionalist liberalism. I’d expect nothing less of a show whose very title substitutes media for persons, and I’m not critical of The Wire per se — rather, I think of the show as one of the best versions of a paradigm that should not be allowed to foreclose other ways of seeing.

***

First of all, The Wire did not exactly invent the drama of the insubordinate detective who bucks the front office to catch crooks. I’m reminded of the brilliant Dirty Harry parody in The Simpsons:

Chief: You busted up that crack house pretty bad, McGonigle. Did you really have to break so much furniture?
McGonigle: You tell me, Chief. You had a pretty good view from behind your desk.
Homer: Ah, McGonigle: eases the pain.
Chief: You’re off the case, McGonigle!
McGonigle: You’re off your case, Chief!
Chief: What does that mean exactly?
Homer: (yelling) It means he gets results, you stupid chief!
Lisa: Dad, sit down.
Homer: Oh, I’m sorry.

The dynamic goes all the way back to the formative years of noir, which has two particularly interesting features as a genre. First of all, from pretty early on, it had a very cozy relationship with film and television. Works by James M. Cain, Dashiell Hammett, Raymond Carver, and Mickey Spillane (among others) were adapted brilliantly for the screen. Film noir directors like Alfred Hitchcock worked with both film and television, and characters like Mike Hammer were used for both. Noir writing was heavily influenced by Ernest Hemingway’s journalistic prose, and emphasized action and things in precise, staccato sentences. It came of age during Hollywood’s Golden Age, and in fact in noir novels one can watch two things begin to fuse: the vicarious gaze of visual media, and a journalistic insistence on unvarnished facts.

Noir was also a genre filled with sins and dark lusts: crime, drugs, deviant sexuality, and whole ensembles of morally gray Machiavellis. It indulged our appetites but retained an antiseptic distance, suggesting more than it showed. The noir hero makes sense of this purgatorial darkness by accepting man’s sinful nature for what it is, and also by martyring himself through a pantomime of corruption. He drinks without getting drunk, kisses almost without changing his expression. He sinks to the depths, and yet the depths do not claim him; he is not aloof, but he does not succumb. He is, in fact, the personification of the camera, and a familiarly American notion of original sin grounds all the “facts” the narrating eye fearlessly reveals.

The best example of how the noir genre then transforms into a politics comes during the third season, when The Wire broaches the subject of legalizing drugs. A renegade major establishes “free zones” in three places in Western Baltimore, enabling drug addicts to purchase and use drugs without interference. The show’s perspective on this is pretty much in line with all the sound arguments for legalizing drugs: violent crime goes down, and some public health outreach becomes possible that would have been impossible before. While the mayor is debating whether he can sell the free zones to the public and the Feds, an aspiring candidate for mayor gets hold of the news and blows the whistle.

So far, so good. Somewhere, in the back of it all, you can hear David Simon saying “If you’d seen what I’ve seen, you’d favor legalization too,” and I agree with him. That said, after watching the show for three seasons, it begins to dawn on you that you have no idea what’s drawing people to the free zones. You’ve seen the character Bubbles getting high maybe a dozen times, then nodding off — cut. You see McNulty and Bunk drinking Jameson until they fall down on the train tracks, and cut. You see the newly hired soldier in Barksdale’s army walking into the room with a prostitute, and cut.

It is critical to see how up-to-the-minute this strange marriage of invasiveness and incuriosity really is. On the one hand, we know everything the characters are doing — my point is certainly not that the show ought to be more vicarious. The show is called The Wire, after all, and despite being filmed during the heyday of the Patriot Act, the show never has the slightest twinge of guilt about any form of surveillance, including wiretaps obtained specifically by manipulating anti-terrorist statutes to aid an ongoing drug investigation. On the other hand, we only rarely understand why a character indulges in the vices that drive the show, just as it is presently fashionable to be frustrated and impatient with other causal theories of human behavior, such as psychoanalysis.

The synchronicity of journalistic objectivity, visual representation, and the privileging of plot (representation of action) over representations of consciousness ultimately produces functionalism: people are what they do, and they do what they do. If that sounds like circular reasoning, well, it is, just like Avon’s “No Marlo, no game.” “If people are going to do drugs, they might as well be able to do it safely without spreading disease or swamping the criminal justice system.” That’s true, but it’s possibly not as trenchant as Trainspotting, which begins and ends with a snarling (and famous) indictment of the alternative:

Choose life. Choose a job. Choose a career. Choose a family. Choose a fucking big television, Choose washing machines, cars, compact disc players, and electrical tin openers. Choose good health, low cholesterol and dental insurance. Choose fixed- interest mortgage repayments. Choose a starter home. Choose your friends. Choose leisure wear and matching luggage. Choose a three piece suite on hire purchase in a range of fucking fabrics. Choose DIY and wondering who you are on a Sunday morning. Choose sitting on that couch watching mind-numbing sprit- crushing game shows, stuffing fucking junk food into your mouth. Choose rotting away at the end of it all, pishing you last in a miserable home, nothing more than an embarrassment to the selfish, fucked-up brats you have spawned to replace yourself. Choose your future. Choose life… But why would I want to do a thing like that? I chose not to choose life: I chose something else.

At many points, The Wire can’t improve on a paternalistic version of laissez-faire: why can’t the drug trade exist in harmony with the world, like other trades? The pushers sell, the users indulge, and McNulty’s there listening in case things get out of hand. Whereas in The Sopranos, it was understood that the Jersey gangsters were a microcosm for capitalism, and the toll, the proverbial “cut” taken out of every life, was very heavy.

Arguably, The Wire is better as a narrative than The Sopranos, and it is much better than Six Feet Under. The plotting in Six Feet Under was horrible: a subplot about a missing woman that dragged on forever, pointlessly complicated medical drama, multiple drug-induced revelations, and petty (and ultimately boring) villainy. Furthermore, the show indulged a kind of histrionic American WASP self-concern in which nothing beyond the personal appeared to have any existence at all. That said, Claire Fisher’s gradual development into an artist was a credible version of a wayward and often invisible process of individuation. In her case, at least, something came of all that chaotic and destructive desire, in a process that involved both her and us in wrestling with interiority. When visual media have to do this, it tends to jam the narrative machine. Transpotting resorts to the voice-over. Both The Sopranos and Six Feet Under employed talky dream sequences and quoted extensively from Yeats, Wordsworth, and the Bhagavad Gita. It was often insufferable, though other directors like David Lynch can make the awkwardness charming. I’m ready to admit that The Wire may be more perfect for its medium simply because it doesn’t play around nervously and ironically with sermons taken from religious and literary texts.

I’ll end with two characters from The Wire‘s second season: Frank Sobotka and Ziggy. If McNulty symbolically martyrs himself on his debauches, Frank literally martyrs himself. He works himself to the bone, up to and including getting involved with every sort of illegal trading, in order to keep the docks he represents alive. He processes a huge amount of dirty cash but sees none of it, passing everything along to his men. He is a creature of such integrity that he actually worries his associate, a criminal boss known as The Greek. Meanwhile, every thing Frank tries to do is undone by Ziggy, his son, who goes even further into crime and then spends the money on fancy jackets and a duck with a diamond-studded collar. When Frank confronts Ziggy about his risky behavior, Ziggy gives a rather pathetic response about the decline of Baltimore’s industries. He’s sad that things aren’t how they used to be, and that’s why he goes into the union bar and sets fire to a hundred dollars. It’s a joke of a causal explanation, and yet Ziggy sees the hopelessness of the situation feelingly, in a way Frank cannot. Instead Frank just keeps going, trying to make it all cohere, until he winds up dead.

We have had a great deal of mysterious badness lately, within and without: Sheriff Ed Tom Bell describes Anton Chigurh as a “ghost” in No Country for Old Men. In the same film, another character says, “Whatcha got ain’t nothin new. This country’s hard on people, you can’t stop what’s coming.” Whether it’s the dry Texas plains or the Baltimore projects, the people who move across these places are ghosts to us: we see them, but we don’t know who they are. What makes Avon Barksdale turn out so differently from Stringer Bell? Why is Greggs driven down the same path as McNulty? What makes an Omar, a Landsman, a Royce?

I won’t ever know the answer. I’ll have to talk about bureaucracies, and I’ll have to ask people which seasons they’ve seen. But Ziggy? Alas, poor Ziggy! I knew him, readers.

The Scientistic Fallacy: Peter Kramer, Judith Warner, and the Debate Over Psychiatric Medication

(x-posted to The Valve)

For scholars in the humanities, there is no way to avoid reflecting on what’s ahead for the discipline, a question that branches in two directions. First, how do scholars respond to the perception that they need increasing amounts of “hard evidence,” particularly historical evidence and cognitive research, in order to justify their claims? A strange disequilibrium has emerged: scientists who appreciate and cite cultural materials are heralded as Renaissance men, while literary scholars and philosophers who draw upon work from other disciplines are merely being faithful to the necessity of rigor, and saving themselves from laughable kinds of theoretical speculation. Second, what can we do with the expanding field of cultural studies? Its impact has been enormous: it has eroded traditional distinctions between media-specific fields (art history and literary studies, for example) as well as between modes of analysis (e.g. anthropology and “close reading”). What kind of work can cultural studies perform for the culture?

The real value of cultural studies is the revival of the broad study of rhetoric, with the aim of creating a more self-aware culture. A case in point is the current debate over medication prescribed for psychiatric disorders. For years now, one of the most recognizable voices in this debate has been that of Peter Kramer, a psychiatrist who rose to fame after publishing an anxious little volume entitled Listening to Prozac. Listening to Prozac was, essentially, a plea for caution. Kramer was impressed by what he’d seen then-newer antidepressants accomplish for suffering patients, but he was concerned that they would be over-prescribed or used to enforce conformity. Then as now, Kramer used amateur credentials as a lover of culture (he has, among other things, published a novel) to add depth and shading to his claims. Over time, Kramer has responded to the evolving conversation about psychiatric medication by taking on the new critics of antidepressants. Instead of urging us to be cautious about medications like Prozac, he now works to neutralize the perceived threat of books like Charles Barber’s Comfortably Numb: How Psychiatry Is Medicating A Nation.

Judith Warner, writing for The New York Times, recently applauded Kramer’s deeply critical review of Barber, published on Slate. Both Warner and Kramer make extremely poor arguments, arguments whose weaknesses appear to be invisible to them because of their disciplinary confidence and ways of understanding expertise. What is remarkable about both columns is the absolute lack of rhetorical understanding: blindness to the rhetorical function of certain medical practices in the context in a given culture, and a worrisome readiness to ground claims about the culture in irrelevant scientific data. What we need is not Kramer’s misleading “hard evidence,” but rather knowledge of what cultural factors are producing the debate over psychiatric drugs, and a sense of how the discourse can be not “disproven,” but transformed.

***

To begin with Kramer’s ending:

We may—this concern was at the core of Listening to Prozac—be using medication to achieve the assertiveness and confidence that our society demands. Or, as Barber suggests, we may be numbing ourselves. But two other possibilities remain on the table. We may be doing pretty well with the imperfect medicines we have. Or we may still be failing to reach numbers of people with substantial mental illness.

Kramer has got to get over the idea that his credentials as a sensitive and concerned individual are guaranteed for perpetuity because he once wrote Listening to Prozac. His penchant for leaving questions open is misleading, since he has no patience at all with Barber and his ilk. Instead, Kramer’s guarded language is designed to camouflage the fact that he uses Listening to Prozac, a book about vigilance and the value of concern, to justify incredibly complacent statements like “we may be doing pretty well with the imperfect medicines we have.” For someone who takes such an active interest in the culture, he has no inkling of how much his own comments echo similar rhetorical moves by ex-radicals, and before them, ex-Communists like Sidney Hook. Warner’s solution is to list all the panicky volumes that reside on the shelf at her office, as though the mere fact of having purchased these books at Borders implies her full and serious consideration of them.

In addition, Kramer has for a long time tried to set inadequate mental health services against criticisms of therapeutic practice, as though Charles Barber’s book had the power to keep impoverished Americans with mental illness from receiving needed prescriptions. How Americans with access to health care are treated is almost entirely separate from the American health care gap. You might just as well argue that attempts to reform nursing homes hurt elderly citizens who haven’t been able to find or afford assisted living. In fact, the health care industry quite cynically advances versions of this argument all the time, for example around the issue of malpractice suits.

These logical fallacies aside, there is a problem with the way Kramer and Warner put such absolute faith in diagnoses of mental illness, at the expense of every historicist anxiety. For example, Warner writes,

We don’t know how many adults suffered from things like depression in the distant past because no one ever asked. The words and concepts through which we understand common mental health disorders today didn’t exist until the last few decades.

In other words, finally, after untold millenia of darkness, we have attained a clear and objective understanding of the human mind. Yet consider what Henry James wrote in 1902, when he published The Varieties of Religious Experience:

Scientific theories are organically conditioned just as much as religious emotions are [...] It is needless to say that medical materialism draws in point of fact no such sweeping skeptical conclusion. It is sure, just as every man is sure, that some states of mind are inwardly superior to others, and reveal to us more truth, and in this it simply makes use of an ordinary spiritual judgement. It has no physiological theory of the production of these favorite states, by which it may accredit them; and its attempt to discredit the states which it dislikes, by vaguely associating them with nerves and liver, and connecting them with names connoting bodily affliction, is altogether illogical and inconsistent [...] for aught we know to the contrary, 103 or 104 degrees Fahrenheit might be a much more favorable temperature for truths to germinate and sprout in, than the more ordinary blood-heat of 97 or 98 degrees.

James is already fully aware of schizophrenic symptoms, which he terms “hereditary degeneracy” and attributes to George Fox and Saint Francis among others. He is aware of manic states, which he calls “auto-intoxication” and attributes to Carlyle, as well as “melancholy,” various anxiety disorders, and epilepsy. The key difference between James’s pragmatism and Warner’s scientism is James’s willingness to uphold those epiphanies that exert a consistent fascination for a human being and her sympathizers, because they seem to possess “immediate luminousness,” which James parses as “philosophical reasonableness and moral helpfulness.”

Warner has no feeling whatsoever for the tensions that exist between “ordinary spiritual judgement” and “immediate luminousness” within the discourse of psychiatry. She assumes that if we could establish a historical baseline for psychological problems like depression, we could then evaluate whether current levels of treatment are scaled appropriately. This misses the fact that even if you could explain to someone from the 17th Century that “melancholy” was actually the illness “depression,” there is no guarantee that you could convince them to accept modern causal explanations or forms of treatment. Differences of psychological and medical vocabularies do not merely divide truth from error; they express competing and potentially unresolvable value judgements. Warner makes no allowance for the contemporary paradigm that would condition such historical research, despite the fact that even while she imagines a complete history of depression, relying completely on the fixity of modern diagnostic words and concepts, Kramer is trying to stretch the definition of treatable illness to cover any person who has “suffered mental illness in the past” or has “one of three other indicators of need.”

In Kramer’s review, inattention to these implicit value judgements plays out when he describes his research on Valium. In response to complaints that Valium was substituting for other kinds of therapy, Kramer observes that women received more talk therapy than men, then announces cheerfully that “Prescribing did not replace ‘quality time’; it supplemented it.” Looking at that data, either the women were being condescended to, therapeutically speaking, or the men were getting inadequate treatment, but this does not worry Kramer. All such concerns must be sacrificed to the grand narrative of “doing pretty well with the imperfect medicines we have.” He continues:

A quarter century later, the evidence about mother’s little helpers is no clearer, but the case can be made that what was at stake had less to do with medication than with society at large. Yes, Valium had its beneficiaries and its victims. But the broad trends now look to have had their own momentum—more conflicting responsibilities for women, less time with patients for doctors, and a loss of cohesion and gravitas throughout the culture.

That’s right — women were taking Valium because all that social turmoil was giving them a pain! There was a serious loss of gravitas (a vitamin found in deep manly voices) causing distress everywhere! Nowhere does Kramer note that women faced “conflicting responsibilites” due to a combination of frozen wages, which forced many women to go to work, and patriarchal domestic life, which forced them to continue doing most of the work of the household. Nor does he talk about the women’s movement, which encouraged many women to take up careers, and the psychological toll involved in thus challenging the expectations of husbands, families, and friends. Any of these explanations would raise questions about the relationship of American psychiatry to ongoing conditions of oppression and injustice — questions, not accusations, designed to maintain our awareness of the historically contingent nature of mental illness and legitimate mental health treatment. Instead, he gives a suspect and reactionary account that detaches psychiatry from “broad trends” that “look to have had their own momentum,” and so turns psychiatry into something it must not be: a discipline that takes no responsibility for its role in American society, existing unconscious of its own ideological foundations.

***

Most troubling of all, though, is Kramer’s (and then Warner’s) trump card: the fact that other industrialized countries prescribe Valium and antidepressants as well, sometimes at a higher rate per capita. As a result, Kramer concludes that “little in the scientific literature suggested a crisis or even a uniquely American response to anxiety.” Warner ties this to her amazingly out-of-character (for a psychologist) statement about the irrelevance of our sentiments in light of Human History Since The Beginning Of Time:

Just because it feels like, just because it sounds like, just because soaring drug company profits and obnoxious direct to consumer advertising seem to indicate that everyone around us is popping pills like mad doesn’t mean that they are doing so. Nor does it mean that we’re in the grip of some new, previously unheard-of, and uniquely epoch-defining social phenomenon.

People have been unofficially drugging themselves for as long as they’ve had the capability to do so. They smoked cigarettes to boost their concentration. They drank cocktails with lunch and dinner — and more — to deal with anxiety and despair. Prior to the modern era of F.D.A.-regulated prescribing practices, they slugged down untold quantities of tonics and bromides.All of which suggests that what social critics now identify as the signature event of our time (the urge to manage psychic pain through substance use) may, in fact, almost always have been a facet of the human condition. It may just be that we’re better at it than ever before – with cleaner, safer, less addictive and debilitating tools at our disposal.

This is the cognitive version of James’s “medical materialism.” Since neurotransmitters and drug interactions have always been the same, there is nothing unique to a time or place about “drugging.” Imagine Kramer following this train of thought even further:

I was able to help compile research that proved that vodka was being exported out of Russia in enormous quantities; vodka is consumed in almost every country in the world, and even plays a prominent role in the “cosmopolitan” cocktail that is so central to the American experience of “Sex and the City.” Little of this evidence suggests a uniquely Russian relationship to vodka.

Based on the evidence I have compiled at Starbuck’s and countless independent coffeeshops in the West, little suggests a uniquely Japanese response to green tea; human beings have been consuming caffeine for as long as they’ve had the capability to do so.

People love wine; they love its smooth and complex flavor, and they often have it as the delicious complement to their dinner, just as their ancestors did. It seems hardly likely that Catholics attending religious ceremonies have a different experience of fermented grape juice than anybody else.

The point should be clear enough; but in addition to these examples of “drugging” in their real social contexts, there are all the cases where human beings have reacted with fear and moral concern against self-medication. Examples range from religious abstainers, including Mormons and Muslims, to atheistic teetotalers like Percy Shelley and Friedrich Nietzsche. Presumably, none of these individuals are interested in “cleaner, safer, less addictive and debilitating” forms of intoxication.

Warner deploys the tools of cultural studies; she calls fears about psychiatric medication “one of the defining tropes of our era,” and later refers to the “storyline” or “narrative” of “mentally vulnerable children and adults” as a fable without an upside. Kramer is similarly eager to engage with culture through its own products: “The world is too much with us; late and soon, getting and spending, we lay waste our powers,” he writes, sounding a bit like Wordsworth. But neither writer can see what we’re prescribing along with the somewhat plastic drugs themselves when we prescribe psychiatric medication in the United States. Naturally, these implicit cultural narratives affect not only patients under treatment, but everyone else as well, for whom the drugs create dividing lines between what is pathological and what is not. Kramer and Warner make their forays into cultural analysis in order to protect against it, a bad methodology that leads to wildly untenable statements about history and culture. Quoting Wordsworth begins to seem tactical, rather than earnest. Their approach will only entrench both sides, particularly when they try to use facts like prescription rates in Sweden to devalue felt responses to the current situation. If Kramer and Warner are serious about protecting the mental health of Americans who need psychiatric medication, they have to accept the challenge of discovering what it is about the ideology of treatment that is making lots of people so uncomfortable: not just drugs that help people resume their lives, but tropes and narratives they can live with.