The Social Netflix

Dear readers,

No matter what I’m doing, whether I’m being social, or working, or procrastinating, or flirting, I’m rarely all that far away from a screen. That’s particularly true now that I’ve got an iPad. While I look forward to writing more about books and movies eventually, it seems natural to blog about how we use technology at this moment when everything is being mediated in new ways by technology that, within recent memory, simply didn’t exist.

Take, for example, Netflix. I’ve been using it for about a decade, with only infrequent interruptions. Right now, it’s going through such a painful adolescence that we may be about to break up, though I’ll be back once Netflix gets the agreements from the film industry that it so clearly deserves. How we use Netflix says an enormous amount about what is working, and what isn’t, as we try to adapt to the “state of leisure” in the 21st Century.

It’s clear where we’re headed: movie theaters will continue to grow larger and more immersive, because that’s the only thing they can do that people can’t duplicate at home. They will also keep getting more expensive, until going to see a movie will be roughly akin to the way, right now, some people infrequently go to the (live) theater. Meanwhile, all kinds of media, from television shows to blockbuster films, will be available on-demand at home, and you will decide whether to pay a flat fee or watch commercials.

That raises two questions: Are we there yet? What will this golden age of media feel like?

ARE WE THERE YET?

We’re definitely not there yet, and the road there is starting to get pretty frustrating. Netflix can’t get the streaming agreements it needs from the major studios, partly (I think) because of pre-existing agreements with premium cable channels like Cinemax. As a result, you never really know what Netflix is going to have, and what it isn’t. Netflix intentionally makes it hard to figure out if a film in your queue is going to disappear, so I constantly find myself ready to watch a certain film, only to learn that it has vanished. Initially, of course, I responded by watching films frantically, but at this point my reaction is one of diffidence. Even with films I really want to see, like Winter’s Bone, I find myself saying “maybe I’ll watch it, and maybe I won’t.” In other words, this complex state of uncertainty devalues films.

Apple is overpriced, but that would be OK if it had everything. It doesn’t.

Accessing popular films isn’t particularly difficult: you can rent them from Redbox kiosks, you can pirate them, you can pay to watch them legally. But there’s no good way to watch classic or foreign films other than a Netflix DVD subscription, and that’s problematic for reasons I’ll discuss below.

Meanwhile, the situation with TV shows is just horrible. Season 4 of Damages exists, but you’ll have to pirate it or watch it on DirecTV, if you are one of their indentured consumers. Hulu+ was supposed to be a great solution for the home and for mobile devices, but the industry keeps denying mobile access to its shows, and playing hide-and-seek with what Hulu maintains for any given show. Plus, it has tons of commercials, and you’re paying to watch them.

In a world where you can purchase most any song ever recorded from iTunes, or stream virtually anything via Spotify/Rdio/etc., this constipated state of video delivery makes no sense. I don’t care what business agreements are holding us back — I’m not going to play the game of pretending I’m in the film industry, making the hard decisions, or the game of siding with one company (Apple, for example) against another (HBO, for example). Right now they all suck.

WHAT WILL THE FUTURE BE LIKE?

I can tell you what I’m hoping for. I’m hoping that, in the future, people will watch lots of movies and television shows in their odd off hours, and that they’ll post ideas about what they’ve seen to various social networks.

I’m not really expecting that streaming video will have an impact on live social interactions, because the accessibility of visual media has turned out to be a social curse. Just this summer, I was involved in at least fifty conversations, few of which I initiated, about whether a given person should watch a given movie or TV show. As Portlandia (a great show that you should watch) demonstrated in one memorable skit, we all feel vaguely anxious about *not* watching the important stuff, and at the same time, we realize that watching it all is impossible.

Therefore, what you watch really depends on what kinds of Freudian neuroses you keep in your hip pocket. Are you hung up on masculinity? Well, then, I recommend Mad Men, Sons of Anarchy, and Breaking Bad. On sex? True Blood and Californication. On work? Nurse Jackie and (again) Mad Men, and maybe Damages or Suits. On snark? 30 Rock and Community. On adolescence? Pretty Little Liars, The Vampire Diaries, and maybe Gossip Girl. How about sentiment? Friday Night Lights and Modern Family. But even within these broad categories, individuals differ, and so much about what we take from these shows is difficult to express. The same goes for films, everything from The Social Network to Crazy Stupid Love. Personally, I thought Midnight in Paris was much less interesting than Vicky Cristina Barcelona, also by Woody Allen, but because people like movies that imply a free introductory lecture on Gertrude Stein, I’m not going to win that fight.

Furthermore, a lot of these conversations about what to watch are examples of accidental bad faith. The people involved may not really intend to watch the film or show — in fact, they’re looking for reasons not to do so, because they sense that this film won’t allow them to spend a blissful two hours re-tracing the maze of their own psyche. The fact that the conversation is happening at all is mostly just a symptom of anxiety.

The remaining technological hurdles make all of this worse. Since you never know what exactly will be showing on Netflix streaming, it often devolves into a glorified version of channel surfing. God forbid you find yourself hanging out with somebody on the 3 DVD plan, desperately trying to figure out which of their 2 or 3 movies to watch. I’ve also spent countless hours transferring stuff to friends, and even to myself, on flash drives, because “the cloud” is not, as yet, really up and running.

Because media is accessible, and because we worry about it, the days of treasuring a film with a whole group of people seem to be coming to an end. I used to get together with friends to watch The Big Lebowski for the nth time, partly because it’s a great movie, and partly because renting movies was a pain. Now, you get those same friends together, and I guarantee they’ll be worried sick about whether or not to watch Blue Valentine.

The wonderful, important conversations that we have about films and television shows happen after “THE END,” if they happen at all. Yet most often, when I make plans to see movies with folks, there’s no time at the end of the movie to let it seep in, and to discuss it. That’s the point when everyone’s most exhausted, and if there’s a journey to make to get home, going home takes priority. That’s where the Internet comes in so handy — seeing, via one of our feeds, what a friend felt after they were done watching The King’s Speech. Maybe they were speechless — if so, they’ll brighten the feed another day.

That reminds me. I still haven’t seen that movie about the stuttering king. I gotta go.

-Kugelmass

On Writer’s Block and Responding to the Joker comments

Dear readers,

Happy Indian summer, everybody! Even if you’ve already headed back to school, or are working an eight-to-five, there’s a dreamlike haze to August, a feeling as though there’s still one or two chances to make good on the hedonistic plans you had for summer, and a suspension of crushing drudgery until the days get shorter and you have to go to those special clinics where the lights are “full spectrum.”

Personally, I’ve found it impossible to blog anything this August, at least until now. Partly that’s because of the goofy comments on my Batman post (exceptions: Daniel Roberts, va, Bill, tomemos). People, you can do better. Both here and at the Valve I’ve had people quoting at me some eighties comic wherein the Joker was declared “super-sane,” and it just makes me want to scream. Just because he’s an interesting villain and we’re interested in subverting normality doesn’t mean we can genially overlook the murders he’s committing. That’s overwrought, theoretical analysis obscuring basic facts, and it’s the most common way criticism shipwrecks.

When Heath Ledger died, he left behind him a small body of exceptional work, much of which will survive as classic (above all Batman and Brokeback Mountain). That is a wonderful thing to have achieved, though I am sorry he died so young. Since I did not know him personally, although I think we did party once at this club at like four in the morning but who can really remember because that night was CRAZY, that is as much as I can say about his death. It seems unlikely to me that a man who could become so many different characters was really driven over an edge by playing the Joker, any more than playing a gay character made him gay. Perhaps the reason that the idea of Ledger getting sucked into the movie is so compelling is that we get to express our anxieties about the ways we ourselves are saturated by films and imitate them.

The politics of the movie are determinedly centrist. It could be cause for liberal alarm that Batman is a self-directed vigilante, but unlike most Dirty Harrys, he has two friendly old concerned dads keeping him in check. In the next movie Jack Nicholson is slated to play his third dad and golf caddy. Between Batman’s spy system and Morgan Freeman’s concern about his spy system, you get the same sort of inconclusive, inoffensive political ping-pong delivered everyday by CNN and the New York Times.

The pathos of the film is that we want to root for the Joker, but we can’t: we understand the principle he represents, and feel in our bones the need for liberation and chaos and detonating the status quo, but people cannot die as part of that process. They cannot be turned from followers into victims — that doesn’t liberate them. So we are caught between hero and villain, hating the city itself and its systems of power…the proud, Gothic high rises of a city whose name has become part and parcel with Batman, “Baltimore.”

I highly recommend Daniel’s post, va’s fascinating comment, and Steven’s final moment where he announces that the sexual fantasies in Fellini movies are entirely realizable in real life. To which I say, if that’s not a good starting premise for a verité blog, nothing is. Certainly better than attacking the culture of teenyboppers, who are only out to “shake it” to savage primal rhythms before driving to “make out point” (their term for movie theaters) and who don’t think long attention spans are “groovy.” Have these kids even heard Vivaldi? That’s some “kickin” glissando, man!

Finally, a post that I wrote a fair while ago called “Zizek the Embarrassment” got quoted in The Nation, and The Nation refused to attribute it. It really got me down. Here’s a magazine that I’ve been reading since high school — that fills every corner of my parents’ house in neat, outraged piles — refusing to let any sunlight filter down to the netroots. I’m not a purist about this medium. Blogging doesn’t have to be cut off from the mainstream media. But unless it’s their blog, that’s how they want it. So these posts are for the questions that don’t have any answers, and for the grits when there ain’t enough eggs to cook, and for the hoods of the world misunderstood. Greenzo out.

Look Back In Anger: The Death of Literary Studies

(x-posted to The Valve)

Amardeep Singh at The Valve drew my attention to this article by William Deresiewicz, writing for The Nation, and also to the outstanding response written by CR and posted to Ads Without Products and Long Sunday.

This is Deresiewicz:

Twenty years after Professing Literature, the “conflicts” still exist, but given the larger context in which they’re taking place, they scarcely matter anymore. The real story of academic literary criticism today is that the profession is, however slowly, dying.

CR responds:

The decline of the English major has corresponded with the decline of two complexly, but distinctly, related things. They are: the reign of theory and what we might call the politicized classroom. These two factors are complexly related, in my mind, because I’m mostly sure that the politics of theory, as practiced by English departments, wasn’t much of a politics at all, and certainly wasn’t a politics with any (easy) applicability in the real world. Further, the de-politicization of the classroom is something that I’d mostly attribute not simply to the failure of theory, but mostly to the changing atmosphere after 9/11, when conservative attacks on “liberal bias” were front and center in the news [...] I am beginning to feel that students have felt the change in the atmosphere of the English department and have responded by finding other subjects in which to major.

Amardeep, in his post, links to a terrifically helpful report from 2001-2002 to ground his point that “theory” has not been responsible for the decline of the English major.

I am on my way to responding to a fascinating special issue of the Yale Journal of Criticism (Vol. 18, No. 2), edited by Michael Szalay and Valve contributor Sean McCann, entitled “Essays on the Sixties from Some Who Weren’t There,” and featuring Szalay and McCann’s own essay “Do You Believe in Magic? Literary Thinking after the New Left.” So, in some ways, this post is a prelude. It is also a reflection on what it means to be apprenticing for a profession that Deresiewicz, an Associate Professor at Yale, thinks “is, however slowly, dying.” To put this in perspective, the job Deresiewicz currently holds is, for anybody in my position, more or less the pinnacle of their professional hopes ten years out.

***

Rather than letting “the decline of the English major” remain an abstraction, let me give some particulars of my own experience. When I was getting my B.A. in English, of my eight closest friends, five were either English or Comparative Literature majors; all had taken part in an intensive humanities program freshman year that included housing all the participants together. By senior year, there was absolutely no distinction between our academic work and the rest of our time. We were working on essays and theses about Henry James, Marcel Proust, Vladimir Mayakovsky, Samuel Beckett, and so on; we were writing our own manifestos, poems, and really long emails; we were drinking cheap vodka (or sometimes some new thing purchased with fledgling credit cards, like cinnamon schnapps) and watching Barfly, High Fidelity, or a student production of Dangerous Liaisons. I’d throw a party, my friend would sit cross-legged on the floor, soliloquizing about track 13 on Exile on Main Street and then disappearing home to write a story called “Rocket Queen.” A series of intensely heated arguments about Heidegger, conducted mostly at around three in the morning, led me to an independent study on Being and Time and my first real introduction to Continental philosophy and “theory.”

By 2002, one year after graduation, my girlfriend at the time had completed her M.A. in Slavic Literature at Stanford, with plans to write and direct for the stage; my other five friends had been accepted to graduate programs in English (Cornell, U. of Chicago), Comparative Literature (U. Penn), and Slavic Literature (UC Berkeley). I began graduate studies in English at UC Irvine in 2003.

Of those five people, one is still in graduate school doing literary studies; she is currently on the job market. My friend who majored in Slavic Literature, once he realized the kind of work he would be allowed to do (historicizing work on lesser-known Russian authors), switched to graduate work in computer science. The rest dropped out in order to attend law school.

When my roommate at Irvine, a new friend and a remarkable scholar, and yet another college friend switched from literature to law school in the space of a year, I remember telling my parents that the discipline had lost its edge. Nothing was “happening,” as we say, and young intellectuals were looking for other ways to have a social impact, or other careers to pursue while they worked on their own poems and novels.

In the four years since then, things have gotten much worse. This is particularly true in California, where Arnold Schwarzenegger has continually sought to cut funding for higher education, but it is true everywhere in the United States. There are practical problems: increased fees and overhead costs, shrinking budgets for grants, less guaranteed teaching, fewer tenure-track jobs. This financial squeeze is one cause of a rash of damaging wars within literary studies, and academia more generally, that illustrate how desperate the situation has become.

For example, there is the spectacle of professors calling for the reform or elimination of tenure, using the same specious arguments that conservatives used during the first Bush Administration about tenured high school teachers; in essence, the idea is to treat teachers like salesmen working on commission. There are also media outlets like The New York Times calling for taxes on university endowments, then supplementing that with reminders that professors aren’t no better than anybody else, and shouldn’t be so uppity. At his blog Acephalous, Scott Kaufman took on the unenviable job of calling out K.C. Johnson, a professor of history at Brooklyn College who created a sensation by fearlessly exposing “political correctness” among fellow professors at Duke.

About a year and a half ago, at the Valve, I wrote:

The ideological differences between Badiou and Michaels, or Zizek and Michaels, are not trivial. (Neither are the differences between Zizek and Badiou.) I am not suggesting that the well-rehearsed disagreements between Lacanians and historicists can be easily overcome. Nonetheless, my belief in the projects of universalism and equality leave me out of patience with the refusal to recognize common ground.

I am reminded of the chapter “The Great Petulance,” from Thomas Mann’s novel The Magic Mountain: “What was it, then? What was in the air? A love of quarrels. Acute petulance. Nameless impatience. A universal penchant for nasty verbal exchanges and outbursts of rage” (673, trans. Woods). The great petulance follows the death of Mynheer Peeperkorn in Mann; for us, it has followed the death of the brilliant and charismatic figure of Derrida.

I now believe that the kind of reconciliation I hoped for in that post will not arrive, at least not without significant clashes coming first. It’s the nature of the blogosphere to invite articulate conflict, of course, but even so I’ve watched one conversation after another in which I participated, and which I thought were cordial dialogues about academia, quickly become bitter disputes. (I should add that in the time since that post, it has become clear that Slavoj Zizek can’t replace Derrida. His fatuous and repetitive lists of political “ironies,” e.g. that Whole Foods is just another capitalist organ, have begun to alienate even his most devoted followers.)

As things stand, there are basically four schools of thought about literary studies:

(1) Critical thinking and writing skills. Some academics believe that the primary value of literary studies is in teaching marketable writing skills, along with “critical thinking,” which is basically the ability to separate yourself from received ideas and representations, and fits with old Jeffersonian ideas about a democratic citizenry. These people are usually the most eager to sink literary studies into broader writing and rhetoric programs, and they like to try to reach students by using multimedia and the Internet (e.g. applying critical thinking skills to a YouTube video). Politically, they advocate a sort of deliberative centrism that in the United States reads as “Democratic.”

The biggest problem with this is that all humanities scholars are qualified to teach writing and critical thinking; these general skills have no special relationship to literary studies.

(2) Historicism. Considering historicism as a whole school of thought, one that has gathered momentum now independent of Michel Foucault and even Stephen Greenblatt, the project is a Marxist project that seeks to explain the material foundations for ideological products (i.e. literary works). There is some lingering regard here for the literary in and of itself, insofar as these literary critics believe that literature represents and preserves ideology in ways other artifacts do not.

This approach blurs the lines between history and literary studies, but the deeper problem is one of sensibility: this particular version of Marxism condescends to its subjects. Because historicism suppresses the counterfactual element in literature — imaginative leaps in excess of historical givens, and frequently opposed to them — it comes off as both pedestrian and pessimistic.

If this seems excessively harsh, consider how many historicist works center on claims about a) popular scientific errors of the time, b) wishful utopianism or progressivism, c) wishful literary solutions to real and perhaps insoluble problems, or d) secret sympathies between a narrative and the prevailing social hierarchy.

(3) The mandarins. This group represents the strange alliance between scholars who have disappeared into the labyrinth of theoretical debate, and scholars who have made aesthetics, in some “purified” form, their justification and refuge. It encompasses both spiraling Zizekian or Derridean ironies as well as Harold Bloom’s gasps of awe. This group mainly consists of academics who already have tenure, or other people in relatively privileged situations, and gets some support (at least on the blogs) from people outside academia who like to think of literature and philosophy as lofty, removed realms. Stanley Fish’s “Think Again” columns fall very much in this category.

(4) The militants. A group that no longer exists, and so will have to be invented. In Saint Paul, Alain Badiou writes in the prologue that “there is currently a widespread search for a new militant figure [on the order of Paul]—even if it takes the form of denying its possibility—called upon to succeed the one installed by Lenin and the Bolsheviks at the beginning of this century, which can be said to have been that of the party militant” (2).

I’m amused by Badiou’s notion of a widespread search: it brings to mind comic book scenarios of searching for a hero or a cure, and perhaps also the image of bloodhounds sniffing out a forest. In truth, no such search is really underway. The very idea is horrifying to professors most invested in teaching critical thinking, who see their job as teaching resistance to militancy and dogmatism. It is equally annoying to many other academics who believe that literature and philosophy are not the proper arenas for militancy, either because culture is ineffectual at producing radical change, or because it is a distant Olympus of intellectual pleasure.

What does it mean to speak of militancy within literary studies? It means passionate commitment to a way of living in the world, one that feels itself to be somewhat at odds with its own time. I love what CR has to say about the rise of self-censorship and phony irony during political discussions with students, but I am also certain that the answer is not just making extreme political statements. The vitality of contemporary popular music is based in part on its association with ways of living life: hedonism, excess, self-expression, community. The glamour that attaches to writing fiction and poetry gains similarly from our notion of that life: among recent critical successes, one might look at Roberto Bolaño’s The Savage Detectives, which is joyously concerned with the communities of bohemians and would-be artists in Mexico. This delight in the absolutism of living through art is equally there in Annie Dillard’s ascetic experiments in sharpened consciousness, and in Jonathan Lethem’s version of nerdy urban hip. When I think back on my engagement with literature and art in college, it was an essential part of a whole life I was living at that time. It is not merely that no major theoretical school has emerged since Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble, as Deresiewicz writes — it is also that one can trace the decline of that work’s meaningfulness in Butler’s persistent effort afterwards to detach her queer studies from the lived experiences of alternative lifestyles, alternative communities, and drag. It is really any wonder that our private conversations come to linger more on the films of Pedro Almodovar or on camp films like Priscilla Queen of the Desert, where drag is not merely the subject, but is also allowed to be present? Yet that arc repeats itself everywhere in the profession.

In short, militancy is another word for idealism, both in the sense of hopefulness, and in the sense of living according to ideas, taken broadly to include all forms of intentional representation. It sounds very adolescent, surely, and yet there is something strange in Deresiewicz’s complaint that “the profession’s intellectual agenda is being set by teenagers.” This isn’t true at all; the profession’s intellectual agenda is being set by the condescending notions of adults about what makes something feel relevant to younger persons, as well as by our own preference for “sexy” topics, identity myths, and multimedia. In fact, the alienated attitude our students adopt derives from the distance we ourselves keep from the literature in question. Furthermore, education always defines itself in relation to youth: without its ardor and skepticism, there would be no Socratic dialogues, no Emile, nor any other treasure of pedagogy.

***

What the profession is experiencing now is less an absolute decline than it is a drop-off following an unprecedented boom in the 1960s; historically speaking, the 1960s were an anomalous period of extraordinary interest in literary studies. In my next post, I will examine how then-popular ideas about culture, identity, and experience created this boom, the backlash against those ideas, and why that backlash has finally led to the presently underwhelming state of literary studies and Continental philosophy.

A Little Something You Can Touch: HBO’s Wire and the Politics of Visual Media

(x-posted to The Valve)

Spend some on a little something you can touch. A new car, a new coat…it’s why we get up in the morning.
-The Greek

You want it to be one way, but it’s the other way.
-
Marlo

Talking about The Wire, which most of the people I know do twice per day, is like repeating a mantra: Season 1 is the police station. Season 2 is the docks. Season 3 is the streets (or, more inaccurately, “politics”). Season 4 is public schools. Season 5 is the press — I haven’t even seen Season 5, but I must’ve heard that six times already. People talk about each season as though they were separate reports from the President’s Council: “Have you started Season 5 yet? Wait, you didn’t see Season 2?” The show’s schematic design encourages people to talk about it in ways usually reserved for non-fiction, with an emphasis on its structural critiques of one poorer-than-average city (Baltimore), and maybe a comment in passing about the show’s brilliant detective/fuck-up in residence, McNulty.

Yes, McNulty’s no angel, but the terms of the discussion are themselves interesting and relevant to the perspective of the show’s writers. The Wire, unlike (for example) The Sopranos and Six Feet Under, is a show written almost entirely from outside the consciousness of its characters. Whereas, in the case of Tony Soprano or Claire Fisher, we felt their highs and lows, inhabited their dreams, and saw how their psychic lives bled into reality, The Wire keeps its distance from the cast, and does a good job of representing the systems that contain them. This (not the pseudo-philosophy of Ayn Rand) ought properly to be called the new objectivism, and it is a sign of the increasing dominance of visual representation (e.g. the television serial) as well as of a certain form of functionalist liberalism. I’d expect nothing less of a show whose very title substitutes media for persons, and I’m not critical of The Wire per se — rather, I think of the show as one of the best versions of a paradigm that should not be allowed to foreclose other ways of seeing.

***

First of all, The Wire did not exactly invent the drama of the insubordinate detective who bucks the front office to catch crooks. I’m reminded of the brilliant Dirty Harry parody in The Simpsons:

Chief: You busted up that crack house pretty bad, McGonigle. Did you really have to break so much furniture?
McGonigle: You tell me, Chief. You had a pretty good view from behind your desk.
Homer: Ah, McGonigle: eases the pain.
Chief: You’re off the case, McGonigle!
McGonigle: You’re off your case, Chief!
Chief: What does that mean exactly?
Homer: (yelling) It means he gets results, you stupid chief!
Lisa: Dad, sit down.
Homer: Oh, I’m sorry.

The dynamic goes all the way back to the formative years of noir, which has two particularly interesting features as a genre. First of all, from pretty early on, it had a very cozy relationship with film and television. Works by James M. Cain, Dashiell Hammett, Raymond Carver, and Mickey Spillane (among others) were adapted brilliantly for the screen. Film noir directors like Alfred Hitchcock worked with both film and television, and characters like Mike Hammer were used for both. Noir writing was heavily influenced by Ernest Hemingway’s journalistic prose, and emphasized action and things in precise, staccato sentences. It came of age during Hollywood’s Golden Age, and in fact in noir novels one can watch two things begin to fuse: the vicarious gaze of visual media, and a journalistic insistence on unvarnished facts.

Noir was also a genre filled with sins and dark lusts: crime, drugs, deviant sexuality, and whole ensembles of morally gray Machiavellis. It indulged our appetites but retained an antiseptic distance, suggesting more than it showed. The noir hero makes sense of this purgatorial darkness by accepting man’s sinful nature for what it is, and also by martyring himself through a pantomime of corruption. He drinks without getting drunk, kisses almost without changing his expression. He sinks to the depths, and yet the depths do not claim him; he is not aloof, but he does not succumb. He is, in fact, the personification of the camera, and a familiarly American notion of original sin grounds all the “facts” the narrating eye fearlessly reveals.

The best example of how the noir genre then transforms into a politics comes during the third season, when The Wire broaches the subject of legalizing drugs. A renegade major establishes “free zones” in three places in Western Baltimore, enabling drug addicts to purchase and use drugs without interference. The show’s perspective on this is pretty much in line with all the sound arguments for legalizing drugs: violent crime goes down, and some public health outreach becomes possible that would have been impossible before. While the mayor is debating whether he can sell the free zones to the public and the Feds, an aspiring candidate for mayor gets hold of the news and blows the whistle.

So far, so good. Somewhere, in the back of it all, you can hear David Simon saying “If you’d seen what I’ve seen, you’d favor legalization too,” and I agree with him. That said, after watching the show for three seasons, it begins to dawn on you that you have no idea what’s drawing people to the free zones. You’ve seen the character Bubbles getting high maybe a dozen times, then nodding off — cut. You see McNulty and Bunk drinking Jameson until they fall down on the train tracks, and cut. You see the newly hired soldier in Barksdale’s army walking into the room with a prostitute, and cut.

It is critical to see how up-to-the-minute this strange marriage of invasiveness and incuriosity really is. On the one hand, we know everything the characters are doing — my point is certainly not that the show ought to be more vicarious. The show is called The Wire, after all, and despite being filmed during the heyday of the Patriot Act, the show never has the slightest twinge of guilt about any form of surveillance, including wiretaps obtained specifically by manipulating anti-terrorist statutes to aid an ongoing drug investigation. On the other hand, we only rarely understand why a character indulges in the vices that drive the show, just as it is presently fashionable to be frustrated and impatient with other causal theories of human behavior, such as psychoanalysis.

The synchronicity of journalistic objectivity, visual representation, and the privileging of plot (representation of action) over representations of consciousness ultimately produces functionalism: people are what they do, and they do what they do. If that sounds like circular reasoning, well, it is, just like Avon’s “No Marlo, no game.” “If people are going to do drugs, they might as well be able to do it safely without spreading disease or swamping the criminal justice system.” That’s true, but it’s possibly not as trenchant as Trainspotting, which begins and ends with a snarling (and famous) indictment of the alternative:

Choose life. Choose a job. Choose a career. Choose a family. Choose a fucking big television, Choose washing machines, cars, compact disc players, and electrical tin openers. Choose good health, low cholesterol and dental insurance. Choose fixed- interest mortgage repayments. Choose a starter home. Choose your friends. Choose leisure wear and matching luggage. Choose a three piece suite on hire purchase in a range of fucking fabrics. Choose DIY and wondering who you are on a Sunday morning. Choose sitting on that couch watching mind-numbing sprit- crushing game shows, stuffing fucking junk food into your mouth. Choose rotting away at the end of it all, pishing you last in a miserable home, nothing more than an embarrassment to the selfish, fucked-up brats you have spawned to replace yourself. Choose your future. Choose life… But why would I want to do a thing like that? I chose not to choose life: I chose something else.

At many points, The Wire can’t improve on a paternalistic version of laissez-faire: why can’t the drug trade exist in harmony with the world, like other trades? The pushers sell, the users indulge, and McNulty’s there listening in case things get out of hand. Whereas in The Sopranos, it was understood that the Jersey gangsters were a microcosm for capitalism, and the toll, the proverbial “cut” taken out of every life, was very heavy.

Arguably, The Wire is better as a narrative than The Sopranos, and it is much better than Six Feet Under. The plotting in Six Feet Under was horrible: a subplot about a missing woman that dragged on forever, pointlessly complicated medical drama, multiple drug-induced revelations, and petty (and ultimately boring) villainy. Furthermore, the show indulged a kind of histrionic American WASP self-concern in which nothing beyond the personal appeared to have any existence at all. That said, Claire Fisher’s gradual development into an artist was a credible version of a wayward and often invisible process of individuation. In her case, at least, something came of all that chaotic and destructive desire, in a process that involved both her and us in wrestling with interiority. When visual media have to do this, it tends to jam the narrative machine. Transpotting resorts to the voice-over. Both The Sopranos and Six Feet Under employed talky dream sequences and quoted extensively from Yeats, Wordsworth, and the Bhagavad Gita. It was often insufferable, though other directors like David Lynch can make the awkwardness charming. I’m ready to admit that The Wire may be more perfect for its medium simply because it doesn’t play around nervously and ironically with sermons taken from religious and literary texts.

I’ll end with two characters from The Wire‘s second season: Frank Sobotka and Ziggy. If McNulty symbolically martyrs himself on his debauches, Frank literally martyrs himself. He works himself to the bone, up to and including getting involved with every sort of illegal trading, in order to keep the docks he represents alive. He processes a huge amount of dirty cash but sees none of it, passing everything along to his men. He is a creature of such integrity that he actually worries his associate, a criminal boss known as The Greek. Meanwhile, every thing Frank tries to do is undone by Ziggy, his son, who goes even further into crime and then spends the money on fancy jackets and a duck with a diamond-studded collar. When Frank confronts Ziggy about his risky behavior, Ziggy gives a rather pathetic response about the decline of Baltimore’s industries. He’s sad that things aren’t how they used to be, and that’s why he goes into the union bar and sets fire to a hundred dollars. It’s a joke of a causal explanation, and yet Ziggy sees the hopelessness of the situation feelingly, in a way Frank cannot. Instead Frank just keeps going, trying to make it all cohere, until he winds up dead.

We have had a great deal of mysterious badness lately, within and without: Sheriff Ed Tom Bell describes Anton Chigurh as a “ghost” in No Country for Old Men. In the same film, another character says, “Whatcha got ain’t nothin new. This country’s hard on people, you can’t stop what’s coming.” Whether it’s the dry Texas plains or the Baltimore projects, the people who move across these places are ghosts to us: we see them, but we don’t know who they are. What makes Avon Barksdale turn out so differently from Stringer Bell? Why is Greggs driven down the same path as McNulty? What makes an Omar, a Landsman, a Royce?

I won’t ever know the answer. I’ll have to talk about bureaucracies, and I’ll have to ask people which seasons they’ve seen. But Ziggy? Alas, poor Ziggy! I knew him, readers.

Why Americans Did Not Watch The Oscars

(x-posted to The Valve)

The Oscars mean two things to most Americans. First, it’s a chance to celebrate the most impressive films of the year, from a mainstream point of view. We wash ourselves clean of forgettable trash like Fantastic Four: Rise of the Silver Surfer, and look back (through a series of painfully short and choppy montages) at films that reflected national fears, intoxications, and bouts of moral seriousness. Second, it’s a celebrity parade and fashion event. This year we didn’t need it. Why?

No Country For Women

At this particular moment, the filmmakers able to hold the aestheticist high ground are making Westerns and gangster movies (blatantly indebted to Westerns) without women. Petitpoussin already faced down this trend here, though she was content just to fire one shot, touch the brim of her hat, and move on in her quiet, laconic way. There Will Be Blood was so pathetically lopsided in this respect that it became farcical. In the final scene of the film, Paul Thomas Anderson attempts to achieve the iconicity of the word “rosebud” by having Daniel Day-Lewis give a speech about “drinking another man’s milkshake,” which means siphoning the oil from an adjoining piece of land.

If it was still 1988, then maybe, just maybe, that wouldn’t be a ridiculous speech. However, it’s 2008, and “your milkshake” and “my milkshake” irresistibly recalls the Kelis song “Milkshake”:

My milkshake brings all the boys to the yard
And they’re like, it’s better than yours
Damn right, it’s better than yours
I could teach you, but I’d have to charge

All his life, virile Daniel Day-Lewis sits apart from women, and Paul Thomas Anderson exiles them from the frames, until the whole sexual life of the film is channeled into the gushing spurts of black oil and the oil merges with Kelis’s bizarrely euphemistic dirty talk. It’s sort of homoerotic, since it comes during an intimate moment between Day-Lewis and his enemy (a boy preacher), but the film has no idea what to make of that; mostly, it’s the inevitable return of the repressed.

It’s worth observing that one of most emotionally turbulent moments in the film comes through Kelis’s metaphor, since men without emotion were so central to 2007′s heralded films. Even Joel and Ethan Coen were guilty of finding this problem more interesting than it really is: grim lands demand grim heroes, money and death have a chill touch, and the masculine cult should be celebrated and condemned. Romance becomes the sterile, pre-pubescent romances of technology and treasure: Javier Bardem blows up a car and performs surgery on himself, Denzel Washington finds a good way to transport heroin, the fields are so rich with oil that Day-Lewis gets some on his shoe.

In fact, what emerges from the supposed aesthetic purism of this year’s nominated films is really the cowardice of the Academy. Superficially, Daniel Plainview (Day-Lewis in There Will Be Blood) is a pawn: the sum of his life’s ambitions amounts to choosing to work with one oil monopoly rather than another. Nonetheless, the film tries to minimize that truth, and compares unfavorably with Gangs of New York, where Day-Lewis played a very similar character but the politics (and the little thug’s illusion of power) were the central point of the final act, not one rich man’s boring decline into decadence. The academy was too stodgy to award Gangs of New York an Oscar for Best Picture, preferring to wait until The Departed, which had about as much political meaning as a hair-dye infomercial. By the same token, when a film appeared that embraced the homoeroticism of the Western mythos, Brokeback Mountain, the Oscar went to Crash.

Julianne Moore, where have you gone? When Paul Thomas Anderson completed his real flawed masterpiece, Magnolia, Moore was there, giving an unforgettable performance as a gold-digger gradually discovering her feelings for her husband. When the Coen Bros. made the modern comedy classic The Big Lebowski, Moore was there as the painter and radical feminist Maud Lebowski, and it’s through her collision with the Dude that “the whole durned human comedy keeps perpetuatin’ itself.” In Children of Men, clearly the best picture of 2007, Moore was the leader of the insurgents who convinces Clive Owen to return to the cause. These films weren’t preachy or self-consciously politically correct about gender; they were simply realistic.

Admittedly, the Coen Bros. did better than Anderson: we have Llewelyn’s wife and her hilariously grumpy mother, as well as a miscellaneous woman who manages the trailer park where Llewelyn lives. These women are the only characters who refuse to play Anton’s games of death — the trailer park woman won’t give Anton information, and Carla Jean won’t flip a coin for her life. They are victims of the men around them, including Llewelyn, who puts their lives in danger while dreaming that he’s saving Carla Jean from continuing to work at Wal-Mart. The film almost manages to suggest that all the men — the “good” guys like Llewelyn, the bounty hunters, the suits, the police — are caught up perpetuating the machinery of death. But Carla Jean is still little more than Andromeda in chains, little more than Naomi Watts in Eastern Promises, compared to Maud Lebowski or Marge Gunderson from Fargo. Confronted by this artificial wasteland of maleness, audiences were supposed to applaud; most of them just turned away. It was The Godfather without Kay, Casablanca without Ilsa.

Perhaps it is a coincidence that vitiated political commentary and lopsided representations of gender went hand-in-hand this year, but I don’t think so. The great political film of the year was Michael Clayton, and it owed much of its power to Tilda Swinton’s astonishingly believable villain. Female characters do not merely create possibilities for heterosexual romance and desire, or for (potentially sexist) outpourings of emotion. Without them, you cannot portray what Martin Heidegger termed “average everydayness,” the interwoven fabric of consummation and disappointment, luxury and poverty, birth and death, family and social life that gives rise to the political. Look at the examples from television — try to imagine The Sopranos without Carmela and Meadow. Al Swearengen (from Deadwood) is a better version of Daniel Plainview, in part because we see him interact with Trixie, Alma Garret, and the cripple Jewel. The hermetic world of men is also the American cult of the exceptional individual, taken to the point of feverish delusion and inimical to the common ground that political thought and work requires.

The unfortunate complement to these tough-guy films are the insular domestic dramas. They have incredibly weak male characters, mostly of the man-child variety, and take similarly improbable turns in order to be nothing more than twee celebrations of family. They’re love poems to America’s white suburbs with facades of anti-suburban hip. Last year, it was Little Miss Sunshine. This year, it was Little Miss Pregnant Sunshine. The Academy turned a blind eye to Quentin Tarantino yet again, but I’ll take The Bride or Zoë Bell over Juno anyday.

Fashion at the Oscars; or, Goodbye Red Velvet Carpet

One of the most interesting effects of the increasingly horizontal possibility of celebrity — reality television, celebrity bloggers, and so forth — has been the way it has redounded on traditional arenas and duties of celebrity. To the best of our ability, we now try to put ourselves in the position of celebrities, which means reacting to the phenomenon with the same ambivalence that they seem to feel. It’s no longer that we want celebrities to be flawed, human, and approachable — “grounded,” as the old compliment used to go — but rather that the process by which ordinary people with talent become famous is now our primary concern.

Think of how central Britney Spears’s story has been to the entire year in tabloid reporting. Her adventures this year were sold to us as a series of nightmares about custody and control. Britney’s out of control! Britney’s lost custody of her children! Various antagonists, including Britney’s mother, manager, and boyfriend, all took turns in the role of the morally dubious handler who seizes control of Britney’s life, particularly when she was forcibly committed to a mental health institution. They, in turn, would accuse each other of trying to control Britney, either directly, or through drugs, or by exploiting Britney’s insecurities and/or mental health problems. The reception of Britney’s artistic work was likewise transformed. For example, when Britney gave a terrible performance of the single “Gimme More” on the MTV Music Awards, viewers responded with comments like “Why can’t they find her a decent wig?” The anonymous “they” of this comment stands in for all of the people, of whom we are now fully aware, who find ways to manipulate Britney into being a marketable commodity.

The allure of the red carpet pre-show at the Oscars always had to do with our relationship to the stars: at their most distant and un-approachable, they were symbols of style. We still believe icons like Frank Sinatra and Audrey Hepburn to have been stylish; even as television announcers gave us the names of the designers for each piece, we gave the stars credit for picking it out, and for exemplifying the glamour to which it alludes.

Three reality shows in particular — American Idol, America’s Next Top Model, and Project Runway — have de-mystified glamour to an extraordinary degree. (To some extent, the makeover shows have also contributed to this, but they are as much concerned with normalcy as with celebrity.) The dynamic of each show works to objectify glamour as something existing outside of any particular human being, to which any human being can aspire. The brutal honesty of Simon Cowell, Tyra Banks, and Tim Gunn is delicious for viewers in its cruelty, but is also meant impersonally. Glamour is not subjective; if it were, you could never teach it.

Therefore, it’s no longer possible to be much interested in what celebrities are wearing on the red carpet, because it’s no longer possible to attribute to them their own choices. If a celebrity is wearing something terrific, we understand that they have been guided to this choice by a series of handlers working with them. If they wear something terrible, we just wonder why they can’t get better advisors. It’s the same with the rest of the celebrity’s functions: while a dinosaur like Hugh Hefner might still have a reputation for throwing wild parties, a show like Super Sweet Sixteen makes it clear that party planners throw parties. The hosts merely afford them.

The dynamic has become the same sadomasochistic dynamic running through Britney’s story. For example, it was leaked to the press that the women on America’s Next Top Model were forced to go without food or sleep, denied ways of amusing themselves (like books), and generally put under unbearable strain. The show itself flaunted trials like having the models do photo shoots in icy water. Far from diminishing the show’s popularity, these revelations served to confirm what we already knew, which was that the process of becoming famous is a painful and violent re-education, with all the dramatic tension centered on what the wannabe accepts, and what she resists, and how, and for how long, all the while risking returning defeated to an ordinary life. Meanwhile, we are increasingly willing to watch specialists perform: dance coaches, karate coaches, personal trainers, stunt men and women, party planners, makeup artists, fashion designers. (My pick for movie of the year, Death Proof, is about stunt drivers battling an evil stunt driver.) It used to be that the red carpet was the stage for the individual accomplishment of taste. The depth of the image was the star’s own subjectivity. Now that we are conscious of the objective and cooperative process of producing style, depth is provided by interactions between people, insofar as each will or will not sacrifice themselves to the demands of the ideal. Anything less, for the contemporary viewer, is too shallow to do justice to the illusion.

The Best and Worst of Intellectual Blogs 2007

(x-posted to The Valve)

What a very long year it’s been. It’s been a year shaped by the evolution of political discourse in this country and around the world. Here, as people grew increasingly sick of the Bush Administration and the war in Iraq, Democrats regained ground. An appreciation for “intelligent,” sensible approaches to complex problems — the basic Democratic credo since Bill Clinton, but one overshadowed by Bush’s cowboy moralism — put moderates at the forefront.

It was every bit as boring as it sounds.

For intellectual blogs, the year started with bangs and ended with whimpers. Many bloggers embraced the models set forth by the political moderates, and worked to create a more inclusive blogosphere that could speak to disillusioned, uncertain conservatives or, on the other side of the fence, pragmatically-minded liberals. In the spring and early summer, there were intense debates about — among other things — feminist issues (Full Frontal Feminism), the efficacy and significance of the American Christian right, and theoretical problems (Andrew Scull’s take on Michel Foucault). However, as the year wore on, the blogosphere seemed to simply fall to pieces. There was less collaborative work, and less antagonism. The effort involved was simply too great, so opposed blogs began ignoring each other or reconciling on the cheap. A genteel solipsism emerged as the norm among intellectual bloggers: “I know not what others may do, but here is my project, for you to interpret as you will.” In the deepening twilight that has followed the deaths of Jacques Derrida and Richard Rorty, what passed for public intellectual discourse became either irrelevant (Stanley Fish in the New York Times) or strained to the point of hysteria (Slavoj Zizek) whenever it didn’t emulate the new centrism.

I hope, in the year to come, that intellectual bloggers will once more be willing to engage passionately with their commenters, instead of looking on in rueful condescension. I hope that more conversations spanning numerous blogs will arise, even if they take the form of blog wars. In any case, it’s December 24th and time for the best and worst of the intellectual blogosphere 2007.

PART ONE: THE BEST

New blogs. Of course, every year a new crop of bloggers arrives, and they invariably have a lot of energy to devote to the uncertain work of posting entries and writing comments. They’ll take on any subject, inhabit any metaphor, consider any claim on its own merits and immanent grounds. In part because of wonderful conversations taking place via N. Pepperell’s Rough Theory, 2007 was the year of Now-Times, Perverse Egalitarianism, and Wildly Parenthetical. At least one of these blogs began earlier, I seem to recall, but nonetheless this was their debut, as far as we here at the Grammy Awards are concerned.

The power of the image. This was the year when intellectual bloggers (with the exception of me) figured out that HTML is a medium that loves graphics and graphic design. N. Pepperell, having already given Rough Theory a terrific makeover, punctuated a return to considering Hegel with marvelous and evocative stills from The Wizard of Oz. Who can ever forget Antigram’s grainy, witty picture of the dominatrix, which he posted right above an attack on Zizek (and Zizek’s supporters) entitled “We Want Discipline”? (Both sides in the debate over Slavoj Zizek came up with astonishing pictures of the man: in the course of a single day, he can look like an inspired prophet and a debauched vampire.) Over at Acephalous, Scott Kaufman made a group of political blogger malcontents continue to discuss Swift Boat under the imposing aegis of Hello Kitty. Of course, speaking of Full Frontal Feminism, petitpoussin gave one side of the debate its rallying flag by taking a single trenchant and satiric photo.

One world, one blogosphere. The old distinctions between the different blog specializations are breaking down. Bloggers have become incredibly aware of the demands and desires of their audiences — more on this later — and one result was a trend towards posts about culture and even gossip on political and professional blogs. Meanwhile, particularly given the consistently lackluster response to posts about books, most intellectual bloggers turned towards politics and professional matters with increasing frequency. Celebrity gossip and reality television became matters of concern for highbrow writers. Political bloggers showed up on humanities blogs to defend their methods and ideas. Political activism, avant-garde poetics, geeky obsessions, and serious scholarly research — all that and more slowly fused together, thanks partly to mega-sites like Salon, BoingBoing, and Alternet, and partly to local friendships between bloggers of different stripes. This year, Timothy Burke coined the term “Everything Studies,” and the phrase clicked everywhere with bloggers. In short, the old divisions that used to produce segregated readerships no longer applied, and everyone benefited from the change. (Correction: I’m delighted to report that our own John Holbo, at The Valve, was the originator of “Everything Studies.”)

PART TWO : THE WORST

Reputation capital and the rise of the cynical blogger. It is inevitable that blogs will become a well-known, legitimate part of public discourse and self-fashioning; as a result, the romantic model of earnest avowals will go into decline. However, it is my hope that blogging will not become merely another avenue for self-promotion. The reasonable tone of so many bloggers just rang hollow this year: eager to appear intelligent and important, they wrote with the imperturable and phony goodwill of people giving interviews on television. Seminars and posts showed up everywhere on the subject of creating a dignified and impressive online persona: you can get famous by blogging. You can advance your career. You can eventually secure some kind of publication or book deal. The whole thing was more sickening than a conversation with a timeshare salesman.

Too much credit for sarcastic contempt. For example, those funny, funny authors who saw it as their mission to write thoughtless, hypocritical “parodies” of other bloggers, in the hopes of immediately earning vast quantities of readers without having to do the hard work of articulating viewpoints. It is terrific to be funny, and there is always occasion for satire, but it was just sad watching reasonable bloggers try to seem hip by linking to and celebrating their mockers. Just as these blogs got too much credit for a continual recourse to sarcasm, too many commenters got stuck doing the verbal equivalent of very slow, loud clapping. The blogosphere cannot survive on dismissals and exasperated gestures.

Fixed ideas. Yes, we are all in favor of long-form projects, but the number of posts that had five, or eight, or twenty sequels this year exceeded all reasonable limits. It didn’t matter the content of blog — everybody was bitten by the continuity bug, myself included, and the overhead was a disaster. Blame television for producing longer attention spans: when you tuned into a blog you hadn’t read in a while, it was like suddenly finding yourself with Season 6, Disc 3 of The Sopranos. Every time you return to something it should show you a new facet: whether that is something new in you, or new in it, is always hard to say, but each piece must be its own revolution.

LOOKING AHEAD TO 2008

So, what’s ahead for 2008? I can’t predict trends, but I can say what I hope for, and that’s a renaissance of words in their essential loneliness. Intellectual blogging is a medium that thrives because it captures the quietude of those moments when we seal ourselves off from our surroundings in order to consider the printed words of another person. The tremulousness of the word, the expectation of an answer, the abjection and shamelessness of writing for self-publication: in order to be honest, a blogger has to be vulnerable, more so even than the author of a book. What she is writing apparently had to be blogged to be written at all. Given the voluntarism of the blogosphere, polish is merely comic; risk is the only thing worth admiring. The risk of saying too much, the risk of being unread, the risk of being misread — intellectual blogging must change from an indifferent exercise of dignified exposition into the willing practice of risk.

Cormac McCarthy: “God Is A Little Boy, And Also Trout”

(x-posted to The Valve)

I’ve just finished reading Cormac McCarthy’s The Road, which set everyone’s hair on fire.

As an example of style, it works; the book is criss-crossed by references to ash and the aftermath of fire, and despite the single-mindedness of the landscape, and the microscopic focus on the father and the son, the minimalism is a triumph. Literally, there is less to do in the postapocalyptic world than there was in the world of cowboys, and this is a help to McCarthy, who otherwise tends to spend a long time on the insignificant everydayness of craft. For example, he will describe how a horse is saddled, or how a cowboy will secure a gate.

The Road is a Christian parable; that is its most important quality, and its downfall. Another Christian parable is a waste of time; it would be more worthwhile just to re-read the Bible. If anything, the patent religiosity of the text made me realize for the first time that the “larder” scene in novels of scarcity (a more profane example being The Ginger Man) is actually a scene of communion, and sometimes also a scene of baptism, if there is an abundance of clean water.

Earlier this month, I watched Eastern Promises, which had a terrific baptism in it. I won’t be hungry for another baptism for at least six months.

Anyhow, the father and the son nearly starve to death. The moment they began to starve, I began to wait for the scene where they would find a tearjerking superabundance of food. It’s on page 123: the dinner of canned pears.

Over the course of the novel, the father struggles to keep himself and his son alive. Increasingly, the son becomes distant, because he rejects his father’s creed of kinship. The son tries to give food away, first to a little boy, then to an embittered old man, and finally to a thief who attempts murder. Angrily, the father says you’re not the one who has to worry about everything, and the son says, I am the one. I think he did not add “I am the alpha and the omega” because the apocalypse destroyed most of the good courses in ancient Greek.

The wasteland is actually described as “secular.” In the final scene, when the boy is adopted by good people, the woman begins to speak to him about God. The Son, however, is too busy conversing with the Spirit of his departed Father. The woman reasons with him that the breath of God passes between people who converse thus.

The final paragraph of the book is about trout, who mazily puzzle the hours in deep, remembering, mysterious waters. It is not clear who is speaking, since the father is dead. To McCarthy, the deep pools are rumors of God. His editor should be reprimanded, or at least subjected to small practical jokes. McCarthy’s editor, I mean. Not God’s.

I don’t think I could have Cormac McCarthy over for dinner. It would get awkward. Nervously, I would talk too much, and he would spoon the candied yams without even looking at them.

I recommend watching the trailer for The Golden Compass. In my dreams, that polar bear fights Aslan. I’m mixed in among the crowd, my fist around a wad of bills, yelling Faster, pussycat! Kill, kill!

I’m McLovin It: Sexuality in the Age of Advertising

(x-posted to The Valve)

The setting is a mojitos-and-burgers place in the Lower East Side: shaded, pricey, with outdoor seating and fresh guacamole. I’m there with two friends, two other women I’ve just met, and a guy who isn’t quite place-able: he may be on a date with one of the two women. The guy, who we’ll call Roger (courtesy of Roger Dodger), sees our waitress arrive, throws one arm around her waist, and says, “If I wasn’t gay, you’d be so mine.” Roger is not gay.

Shortly afterwards, almost without a segue, Roger launches into his own version of the “blonde” scene in A Beautiful Mind. The original is the epiphany that leads Russell Crowe’s John Nash to the “game theory” that will eventually earn him a Nobel Prize. In the film, a bunch of men are huddled around a table, trying to figure out how to approach a gorgeous blonde woman at the bar. Nash, generally clueless about socializing, suddenly realizes that the blonde is making everyone else feel inferior. If his friends chat up everyone else, they all walk away with a date. Nash tells everyone to opt-out of the sexual competition, albeit in a way guaranteed to make the blonde woman miserable.

The epiphany is foreshadowed earlier in the film, when Nash loses a game of go. “I played a perfect game,” he fumes. His opponent, laughing, disagrees, since if Nash had played perfectly, Nash would have won. Nash responds by sweeping the pieces onto the ground and shouting that the game is flawed.

Back to Roger. In his version, the story ends like this: “But then, if you see that the blonde is getting interested, then you have to figure out how to lose the brunette.” So long, game theory! It will turn out that Roger also doesn’t know A Beautiful Mind, having gotten all this elsewhere. The waitress comes back, and Roger says, “I’m sorry, I always get in this mood when we’re out together.” Like what?, the waitress asks, and Roger says, “Oh, so obnoxious and funny.”

Obnoxious and funny do not go together, and they’re not supposed to. Whoever came up with that line — almost certainly not Roger — is using the superstitious quality of moods, which are perpetually so ill-defined that they can mean anything, to set up the boast about being funny. I’m funny is defused by I’m obnoxious, just as you’d be mine was defused by I’m gay. Since obnoxious is an ambivalent term, used almost affectionately to describe people who compel attention and don’t mince words, it appears to be self-deprecating, but isn’t. Oh, and as for the first line, which cheerfully and cynically makes use of the stereotype of gay men as non-threatening:

Then turn to the girl you want and add, ‘If I wasn’t gay, you’d be so mine.’ -Neil Strauss, The Game: Penetrating the Secret Society of Pick-Up Artists, page 22

In a lot of social circles, over the next few years, the majority of straight guys will simply turn into Roger, who is already a sort of photocopy. To a lesser extent, so will the gay guys and the women. One of the catalysts, though not the only one, will be The Game and the forthcoming movie based on it. (For those of you living under a rock: The Game is about a nerdy music journalist, Neil Strauss, who learned from a series of for-hire gurus how to be a seducer.) There will be a backlash — and frankly, it can’t come quickly enough — when everybody learns the new lines, and they become turn-offs. But this isn’t about lines per se: it’s about the evolution of sexuality in the context of economics and culture. Nor am I out to cheapen the discussion from the get-go with a lot of manufactured moral outrage. Roger’s not a terrible guy — the game is flawed, in ways that go far beyond Strauss’s book.

In the course of writing for The Valve and The Kugelmass Episodes, I’ve returned frequently to the cultural effects of a very practical problem: the expanding work week in the United States, the wage freeze, and the concomitant “Protestant work ethic” that has made it so difficult for the U.S. to achieve parity with Europe in terms of the impact of employment on quality of life.

In “Sexuality, Pop Culture, and Magic,” I wrote about Buffy the Vampire Slayer, and the strange equations at its heart. Buffy puts reason and work on the side of life, and magic and sex on the side of death — or would, were it not for the fact that life needs its opposites. Life without death is the undeath of vampirism, and life without enchantment or desire is also undeath, as dry as dust. Magic comes to stand for the secret kinship (steeped in Freud) between irrational lusts for sex and blood, and the irrational core of love and passionate commitment. Life needs the irrational, the passionate, even if that has its secret springs in death. It needs the music as well as the words.

Subtly, this conflates work with reason: for Americans, and perhaps for Westerners more generally, the profitable is the rational. Should it turn out that productivity demands leisure, and romance, and feelings of enchantment, no problem: we’ll roll up our sleeves and figure out how to produce those things. Also at stake is the determination of unevenly privileged people, such as white male nerds and workaholics, to bring their social lives up to par with their professional success. Tomemos put it in terms of the difference between “those who use popular culture to supplement and enrich their lives and personalities, and those who use popular culture as their personalities,” with Strauss and his ilk falling squarely in the latter category, whether or not we inveigh against such acts of mimicry and experimentation. Whatever is impossible or imprudent, and thus can’t be produced, can be simulated. For a long time, the empire of advertising has been precisely that necessary bridge between the good life — vitality, pleasure, power, and diversion — and the world of the working stiff — exhaustion, duty, and routine. Starting now, however, advertising is poised to make a big acquisition: it will become not only the way that corporations speak to consumers, but also the paradigm for how people represent themselves to one another in private life.

One way in which the work ethic has historically entered private life is through the self-help book. Books like Dale Carnegie’s How to Win Friends and Influence People, or Stephen Covey’s 7 Habits of Highly Effective People, posited absolutely no difference between personal and professional environments: what worked in one would work in the other. But, because Carnegie and Covey were both unwilling to grapple with advertising, they had little to say about the good life. Carnegie advised taking a keen interest in other people’s avocations, because that greased the wheels of business; Covey dismissed this with a shudder, and recommended a sort of New Age, “spiritual” leisure that he called “sharpening the saw.”

For the most part, then, your leisure was still up to you. Meanwhile, Carnegie and Covey are the absolute rulers of the workplace. When you read them now, there is an eerie feeling of recollecting every poster in every office, every excessively promoted “mission statement,” every injunction to smile. Covey has a funny sort of anxiety of influence where Carnegie is concerned. Like Carnegie, he wants sincerity over flattery, the genuine instead of the fake, and he sees Carnegie as a man employing “tricks” because he sees the other man more clearly than he sees himself. Both of them use tricks that, as a whole, constitute systems. Modern businesses effortlessly combine these systems: Carnegie’s bland politeness is the model for handling inter-corporate relations, while Covey’s contractual “stakeholder” model influences intra-corporate management and the rhetoric of success: Our company finds proactive ways to expand our effectiveness while remaining in harmony with our core values of honesty, responsibility, and mayonnaise. So, lest anyone read too darkly into the following discussions of private life, it is worth remembering that human interaction in the workplace is already standardized to the extent currently possible, and that the workplace determines what kinds of social products will be offered for consumption after hours.

“Your leisure is up to you” — what a terrible mistake. Nothing should be left up the consumer, because on the small scale, people don’t know what they want. If they did, there wouldn’t be terribly much for advertisers to do. On a larger scale, everyone knows exactly what they want: an entirely new life. So Dale Carnegie proclaims: “I’m talking about a new way of life” (27). On the new VH1 show The Pick-Up Artist, Neil Strauss’s friend Mystery tells his disciples, “This is about building a life.” (All competitive reality shows, and all makeover-style reality shows, are based on this craving for a new life via deus ex machina.) But on the small scale, product by product, interaction by interaction, there is no new life. There is a promise, a glimpse: enough of an interruption of normal life that the world stands still. That’s the soul of the advertisement.

In the pilot for the new advertising show Mad Men, which is (not coincidentally) also a sexist tour de force, the characters begin discussing Freud with an uptight German expert, and finally one adman says: “So we’re supposed to believe that people are living one way, and secretly thinking the exact opposite?” The star of the agency throws her out of his office, but by the end of the show we learn that he feels eternally disappointed in life, eternally at sea. He’s Lord Byron, in truth, and that’s why his advertisements are so good.

It’s a self-fulfilling prophecy anyhow: it’s nice to be secretly thinking like a rebel, to have unsatisfied longings. It helps to be Byronic. Otherwise, no depth — and yet the depths are all the same, or else Don Draper’s ads could never work.

Rules, Rules, Everywhere

The sea change began with the advent of rules, on both sides of the heteronormative gender divide. Remember the discussion in Swingers about how long to wait before calling for a date? Maybe that was the first time the rules hit the mainstream. It was certainly a great example of the comeuppance tale: at the end of the movie, Vince Vaughn is in a hysterical state of self-delusion, confusing a mother playing with a baby for somebody hitting on him, and dancing offensively on top of a diner table. Jon Favreaux, the ordinary schlub who can’t get over his ex-girlfriend, turns out to be much more mature, and ends up with better romantic prospects.

Rules and the how-to language of personal relations have seeped into culture because we constantly interact with strangers. Rules are a way of making the bewildering tide of new people and new relationships comprehensible, bounded. If one were to try to deal with individuals on an individual basis, one would quickly drown. Rules are also nothing new: guides to etiquette and social success have been around a long time, but history casts its changing light on them. We are emerging out of a period when, through the influence of the counterculture, universality was inflected differently. Rather than taking shape as a set of rules for individual interactions, solidarity was founded radically, on divisions between old communities and new ones: screen romances, like The Graduate, or Bonnie and Clyde, or The Hustler, or even Rebel Without a Cause, portrayed two people who helped each other take shelter against the world. The scene in The Graduate where Benjamin Braddock bolts the church doors shut with a crucifix, imprisoning the adults inside, is much more unequivocal than the scene following, where he and Elaine Robinson sit nervously at the back of a bus. In The Crying of Lot 49, Pynchon’s Oedipa Maas begins by looking for her late ex-boyfriend Pierce Invararity, and ends up discovering a secret society.

In short, the new comportment guides and the new flourishing of rules are signs of the retreat back to a more conservative world, constructed of smaller pieces: surviving daily social interaction, and trying at all costs to avoid permanent bachelorhood or spinsterhood. It is a world that lacks the political conscience of the original culture of rebellion. In the context of a longer working day, as well as a disruptive and predictable series of physical moves for middle- and upper-class Americans — college, first jobs, second jobs, and so on — it is very difficult to factor in the wishes of more than one other person. So contemporary sexuality is deep-dyed by the fact that for some people (male and female), having a committed relationship is not at all desirable, while for others, it is the only kind of relationship they can expect to remain consistent during their 20s and 30s. Even the worlds of swinging and “polyamory” are outgrowths of this renewed emphasis on the nuclear family model of caregiving, to the extent that caregiving and co-habitation can be separated from sexual monogamy. (For more on the romance of caregiving, I recommend the outstanding post on the TV show “Grey’s Anatomy” at Irrelevant Narcissism.)

However, we have a bad conscience about returning to rules, because it means downplaying the role of difference and individuality in social interactions. As a result, as I mentioned earlier, rules culture is steeped in fantasies of failure or punishment, and there are often echoes of the Commendatore punishing Don Giovanni. In The Tao of Steve, the main character eventually learns that his seducer’s rules stand between him and love, and the film ends happily with him in more “genuine” romantic pursuit. In real life, the film’s creator, Duncan North, made no such discovery, and the relationship failed. However, the plot arc of films like The Tao of Steve, Rodger Dodger, and Hitch do exactly what they are supposed to do: they reassure people that the rules don’t work when you’re really in love, even if the cost of making that point is sliding into territory so conventional that it would horrify Nora Ephron. It becomes possible for a blogger like thinkinggirl to write, after reading about a pick-up artist clone, “Didn’t these people see Hitch?” The modern climate is so retributory that Jude Law’s Alfie, who is mostly guilty of being an opportunist, is treated with vastly more anger than Michael Caine’s actually loathsome original.

In Wedding Crashers, also about rules and scams, the punishment plot doesn’t even cohere. In his supposed speech of apology, Owen Wilson can’t stop himself from calling the original scammer, now a funeral crasher, a “genius,” and the film ends with all the principals crashing weddings, in a big sentimental celebration of sameness.

The worst offender in this new series of morality tales is actually The Game, since Strauss is the one who appears to have stuck the match and lit the powder keg when it comes to new scams. The Game begins with Strauss’s guru Mystery on the verge of committing suicide, and throughout the book Strauss tries as hard as he can to portray Mystery (who now has his own TV show) and the other “pick-up artists” as too steeped in darkness to thrive. Strauss himself, on the other hand, is just a nice guy who has trouble with the ladies, and after he learns the rules of the game, he then abandons all of them in order to have a truly meaningful relationship with Courtney Love’s bassist. All of this is well and good, except for the fact that Strauss’s girlfriend now helps him promote the book, claiming that Strauss’s journey of self-transformation was probably a necessary pre-requisite for their relationship. The real people use the rules to intrigue us about the book, and the book uses a conventional ending, starring those same folks, to reassure us that the rules don’t matter.

Of course, in addition to this, that, and the salsa teacher’s lessons in L’Auberge Espagnole, there are also the bestselling books that together comprise The Rules, a guide for young women trying to meet and marry “Mr. Right.” Slavoj Zizek, who never seems to miss an opportunity to analyze something, had this to say:

‘Rule Girls’ are heterosexual women who follow precise rules as to how they let themselves be seduced (accept a date only if you are asked at least three days in advance etc). Although the rules correspond to customs which used to regulate the behaviour of old-fashioned women actively pursued by old-fashioned men, the Rule Girls phenomenon does not involve a return to conservative values: women now freely choose their own rules – an instance of the ‘reflexivisation’ of everyday customs in today’s ‘risk society’.

What Zizek misses in his analysis is that The Rules is not an example of reflexive choosing. Instead, it is an example of the fundamentalist response to the perceived threat of nihilism, a phenomenon entirely familiar as the pattern of contemporary religious fundamentalism. With a full view of the supposedly crumbling edifices of courtship and marriage, the Rule Girl tries to cleave ever more perfectly to the old rituals because the alternative is chaos. This is not represented as a free choice; it is a personal necessity (unless you want to be an old maid) and a social responsibility (loose women are letting the whole sex down).

It’s a very bad idea to think of fundamentalism as ineffectual merely because it is short-sighted and hysterical. It’s also hard to know where to begin with The Rules, even if one leaves aside its faux-Victorian crimes against the English language: “After all, modern women aren’t to talk loudly about wanting to get married” (5). Advice like “On the date itself, be quiet and reserved” (37), is a form of deeply patriarchal silencing, and one that could very well have an effect opposite the one intended if the man likes expressive women. There is a lot of advice about how to conform: what magazines to read, what to wear, what kind of haircuts to get. Perhaps the biggest problem is that the book thinks of courtship and marriage as such totally different, practically unrelated things that it sets the stage for very unhappy marriages, brought down by revelation after unexpected revelation.

There are certain superficial resemblances with The Game. The Rules pretends to be the inspiration for an underground movement, and advises leaving ‘em wanting more, which as far as I can tell is advice that began with the vaudeville circuit. More important are the two paradoxes at its heart, paradoxes rooted in the painful and irritable aloneness that all modern people know, and the despairing preference for aloneness. The first is expressed here, in one of many representative sentences:

Act independent [...] Go to the movies, to the shopping mall. Just go. This will make him desperate to catch a minute of your time [...] Men love independent women because they leave them alone. (120, italics mine)

To love and be loved is to be absent and inattentive. It is hard to imagine, beneath the bubbly tone, a more desolate message. Ellen Fein and Sherrie Schneider write, “A relationship with a man is different from a job” (11). Then they write, “We believe in treating dating like a job” (57). A riddle: what is and is not a job at the same time? Advertising, the collective dream chest. Or, as Fein and Schneider put it in a chapter heading:

But First the Product — You!

“But remember,” Mystery said sternly. “You are no longer Neil Strauss. When I see in you in there, I want you to be someone else. You need a seduction name.”
–Neil Strauss, The Game

EVAN: The guy’s either going to think ‘here’s another guy with a fake ID,’ or here’s McLovin, the 25-year-old Hawaiian organ donor.
FOGELL: I am McLovin.
Superbad

“I’m Lovin’ It” is a single by Justin Timberlake. Released in 2003, the Neptunes-produced track was used as theme for McDonald’s same-titled advertising campaign.
Wikipedia entry

The real glory of the McLovin character in Superbad is not so much that he thinks he’s a badass, despite being a dork. That’s a film cliché and an easy laugh; it was also true of two different characters in Can’t Hardly Wait, for example. The genius part is the name itself, “McLovin,” which conflates two different McDonald’s branding campaigns. The reason it has been so easy for people like Mystery to become gurus is that marketing was always already the paradigm for their invented selves.

Authenticity and Twee

For me, the happy medium is Twee: a return to the pleasures of holding hands, of shyness—but a shyness that is always one step away from hooking up. It’s conservative in its rejection of balls-out hedonism, but revolutionary in its rejection of the personal=political baloney. It gives us our relationships back wrapped in a light cloth of ethics: “be kind” is always the hidden message of Twee.
–Luther Blissett, comment to the Valve

Originally: ‘sweet’, dainty, chic. Now only in depreciatory use: affectedly dainty or quaint; over-nice, over-refined, precious, mawkish.
–OED definition of ‘twee’

Of course, there are many currents of reaction against all of these “manuals.” To my mind, the most significant reaction is not back towards some other ordinariness — what would that even mean? Cosmo? Maxim? — but towards a certain formulated sort of sweetness and awkwardness that pokes through everywhere in our culture. In pop music, it’s sometimes called twee or emo.

Thinking Girl writes:

Where is there any room for honesty, for authentic feeling (beyond sexual arousal)? With all the trickery going on here, we only distance ourselves further from the chance for anything genuine at all.

The question is what this romantic honesty will look like — what clothes, so to speak, it will wear. For the time being, we have our answer: it will resemble the films of Zach Braff and Wes Anderson, the music of Belle and Sebastian and Bright Eyes, and the continuing literary aftershocks of The Catcher in the Rye. There will be people who give up on clubs, bars, and what they tend to call “irony,” embracing gentler modes of interaction, slower and more tentative means of courtship.

I re-printed Luther’s comment because I still like it. Works of art, and ways of life, that put kindness and compassion first are moving, and have every right to be. Unlike The Rules, which are sad without realizing it, an unshakable melancholy runs through oeuvre of these new romantics, offering solace for unexpressed feelings, and a sort of respite from the pitiless march forward.

At the same time, this model is not a stable one; it is, at its best, a kind of mood. Let’s run with the work metaphor for a second: imagine you had a job where, in order to do it right, there had to be all kinds of delays, breakdowns, and failures. It would be unbearably confusing at first, and then it would turn into pure performance: the competent performance of incompetence. Nonetheless, this is the operative model for authenticity: EXPECT FREQUENT DELAYS. It produces paralysis. Some of you may have seen the new indie film Once, a romantic musical where, for no particular reason besides mutual indecision and awkwardness, the romance peters out and dies. Or look at the role of sex in The Catcher in the Rye: Holden has a lot of unsatisfied longing, but virtually nothing happens to him except a crash landing in a seedy hotel, where he watches a couple spurt water onto each other and gets into trouble with a prostitute and her pimp. We sympathize with his dislike of Stradlater and Ernie, but the truth is that all the while he’s dreaming of playing a woman’s body “like a violin.” He’s a confused teenager, and it’s distortive to reduce him down to his hatred of phonies.

When the paralyzed teenager matures into the paralyzed adult, the results are just nauseating. Everywhere Zach Braff shows up, he plays the same character: a hapless, sweet guy who needs one or several take-charge women to shape him up and help him resolve his issues. In Scrubs, the pain this causes is relieved by Dr. Cox, who, like Dr. Gregory House, is Humphrey Bogart rather than Holden Caulfield. In Garden State, nobody does show up to make things better, and Natalie Portman has to work so hard that, were it not for her epilepsy helmet, her head would probably explode.

The worst element of the new romantic movement is its regressive tendency. Even the “sweet” core of comedies like Superbad, Napoleon Dynamite or American Pie is inseparable from the emphasis on adolescence. Watching movies and television shows (i.e. The OC) about high school is reassuring because it makes us feel as though we’ve earned the right to look back with a knowing chuckle on when we were as naive as all that. But, as I suggested in my earlier post on reflexivity, this distance doesn’t necessarily lead anywhere: on its own, it isn’t capable of creating new content. Holding hands isn’t even something 12-year olds do that much; the omnipresence of hand-holding as an image of innocent childhood romance disguises the fact that, at least in terms of cultural representations, emotional dynamics don’t change that much between 18 and 28. What changes, out of necessity, is the level of concern with practical matters. There’s nothing particularly sweet about the romantic quest in Sex and the City, for example, and the message certainly isn’t “be kind.” Thus the nostalgia for adolescence is as desperate as it is superior, because what adolescence really represents is a period when there was enough time, and enough unknowns, that romances felt less arranged. In absence of that real slow time, we are back to simulation and the montage promises of the commercial.

In other words, the problem isn’t honesty. From a certain smarmy point of view, it’s honest to go around telling people you want to sleep with them. The problem is that people are trying to meet perceived sexual and romantic needs in the midst of demanding, or else unsatisfying, waking lives, and doing so under conditions of continual unfamiliarity. You can hurry love, but not without changing it in the process.

This is not to say that honesty is impossible. There are lots of honest artists out there, if by that one means something like “articulate memoirists.” It’s just that our definitions of honesty are inseparable from our ideas about self-understanding: distinctively honest artists produce confessions and acts of self-therapy from inside their own private worlds. Their subject is still aloneness, and there’s nothing necessarily sexual about it, or even honest when it comes to other people:

Can’t you see I’m trying
I don’t even like it
I just lied to get to your apartment
-
The Strokes

Twee can be, as the saying goes, pulled off quite easily. It can be acted. One of the best twee songs out there, “We’re Going To Be Friends,” which was used during the opening credits for Napoleon Dynamite, was performed by the White Stripes, who are also heavy into sleazy, macho electric blues. And we’re still in a world of name brands: the White Stripes developed a color scheme (the same candy-cane motif as Target) and a gossip scheme (brother/sister? husband/wife?). As for Napoleon Dynamite, well, you’ve seen the T-shirts. We encourage you to vote for Pedro.

The Chickens Come Home To Roost: The Game

In the new world of advertising, the advertisers are, like you, alienated from their own mediums. They’re not corny, and they’re not trying to be plain-spoken. Gone are the days of the serious confidante with the sensible haircut, who looks straight at the camera and tells you how many doctors prefer Tylenol. Modern commercials are absurd and often extremely indirect; in order to know what the product is, you might have to go to the website (as with the Lincoln/beaver ads for sleeping pills, with the tagline “They miss you”), or you might have to wait until the final second of a 30-second ad. The new ad for Herbal Essences shampoo subverts the traditional image of a woman tossing her glossy hair with a grungy biker tossing his glossy hair. If a commercial is going to go vulgarly over-the-top, like the Axe deodorant ads where a thousand women rush one man spraying it on, there will be a ludicrous Ben Hur soundtrack to let you know that Axe Corp. also finds it all quite silly.

So our response to advertisements has softened. We resent them less, and periodically even recommend them to each other. In addition, we tend to act as though the matter of advertisement has been settled. We accept its omnipresence, and we accept that certain demographics (including politicians and performers) will always be on the hustle. For example, it is obvious to everyone that the “contest” between rappers 50 Cent and Kanye West over album sales is a sales ploy, but no-one resents them for putting on the pageant.

Now, of course, it’s irritating if somebody gives you the hard sell. Nobody wants another round of the Dale Carnegie school of aggressively friendly networking. But then nobody wants to see an old school, “trust 4 out of 5 experts” advertisement either. A guy like Mystery isn’t modeling himself after John D. Rockefeller. He’s modeling himself after Prince; who says other guys can’t change their names just because they don’t have recording contracts? Rock stars and movie stars don’t have the same names as other people, don’t dress like other people, and don’t act like other people; they fulfill all kinds of fantasies, most of which are on display on American Idol (not to mention America’s Next Top Model, from which Mystery’s show shamelessly cribs). But again, American Idol depends on a line drawn between contestants and non-contestants, winners and losers, which exists only through the show’s own arbitrary structure. There are no fixed limits on who gets to simulate being a rock star, and who doesn’t. So Mystery tells people to change their names, to dress like rock stars (“peacock theory”), and to act with the diffidence of a celebrity. At the end of Superbad, the cops pretend to be dragging McLovin off to jail so that he will have more cred.

There are also none of the usual guardrails up, that would otherwise make behavior predictable and boring. An opening line isn’t going to sound like an opening line, just like an ad won’t look like an ad. The line will be stolen from one of the woolgathering monologues in Sex and the City: “Is kissing cheating?” (from “The Cheating Curve”). Or it will be just random, about a barfight, or flossing, or something else left-field and non-sexual. A straightforward question, like “What do you do?”, will get an indirect, absurdist answer, because small talk is boring.

Since the pick-up artists in The Game have nothing to sell but themselves, they become cultural flypaper, gleefully adopting whatever language of connection and empathy they can get from self-help books, and then glazing the whole thing with irony: normally, I’d feel embarrassed to say this, but with you I can talk openly. There was a recent ad campaign for Bacardi where the drinker took a sip, and was (per usual) transported to a world of music, dancing, and gorgeous people. At the end of the ad, it turned out that this whole Xanadu was imaginary — the ad itself owned up to it. Bacardi can make you feel like there’s a party going on, even though there probably isn’t. So, too, a pick-up artist can talk to you about his dream of sipping ouzo in Corfu, and then, if somebody calls him on it, exclaim with ironic sophistication: “I know! It will probably never happen, but it’s nice to think about, isn’t it?”

When I talk about “the chickens coming home to roost,” I mean that every structure designed to compensate for the absence of real understanding can be appropriated. Strauss writes,

“I have to ask you guys: How long have you known each other?” I began.
“About six years,” one of the girls said.
“I could totally tell.”
“How?”
“Rather than explain, I’ll give you two the best friends test.”

The girls leaned in toward me, thrilled by the idea of an innocuous test. Guys in the community have an expression for this phenomenon: I was giving them “chick crack.” Most women, they say, respond to routines involving tests, psychological games, fortune-telling, and cold-reading. (159)

Yes, how disgusting. But that’s not the only thing to take away from the anecdote. As a whole society, we are thrilled by personality tests and the like. You might not be into tarot, just like you might not be into Limp Bizkit, but in that case the Asperger’s Test could be right for you. The men in Strauss’s world aren’t going to go up to anyone and ask their sign — that’s both too obvious and too open-ended. But the wealth of superstition, and the intense hunger for easily obtained self-knowledge, are there waiting to be exploited. It’s just not true that one can play around with, “bracket,” a belief in the supernatural, magic, New Age speculation, or more rigorous-looking things that work like magic — personality tests, number games, and so on. Inevitably, in the equally bracketed world of the personal, all of it will reappear as someone’s deliberate creation. The British mentalist Derren Brown performed a trick where he obtained handprints, birthdates, and a personal object from people in New York, the UK, and Barcelona. He then gave them a personalized psychic reading, which many participants claimed was both highly specific and very accurate (90% or more). Brown gave all of them an identical reading.

Conclusion: Coming Soon To A Theater Near You

In the final instance, [love] amounts to modern society’s radicalization of the difference between personal and impersonal relationships. It is not much of an exaggeration to say that this difference can be experienced in every social relationship: impersonal relationships are ‘only’ impersonal relationships. Personal relationships are overburdened by the expectation that one will be in tune with the person, and this often dooms such relationships to failure — which in turn only serves to intensify the quest for them and makes the inadequacy of exclusively impersonal relationships all the more apparent.

…This could mean that, contrary to earlier claims, a deeper understanding of love is hardly a suitable guide nowadays to entering into or warming to an intimate relationship. Notions based on exchange that have been blocked out of the code of real love may be more suited to this task, although it is impossible to specify how selflessness and an orientation to the other person could become embedded in a broader and deeper understanding of exchange.

…Other approaches often question how it is even possible to initiate personal communication in public situations and given the brevity of contact which is to be expected in such cases.

-Niklas Luhmann, Love As Passion: The Codification of Intimacy, 161-162

As with the advertisement, the history of the film trailer has become more interesting in the last ten years than for fifty years preceding. Trailers are easily available: you can watch them from home, you can collect them (by downloading them to your computer or buying the film on DVD), and they have even developed their own logic of tension and fulfillment, over and above the tension and expectation they create for the film itself. The studio will release a “teaser” trailer, which creates an appetite for the full-length trailer. The notion of showing up on time to a movie has become showing up for around 20 minutes of trailers, including as a lead-up to feature presentations that might not be 90 minutes long.

The trailer has become reflexive; there are now trailers, like those for Comedian and The Ten, that are satires of other trailers. Trailer voice-overs are now subverted or used parodically. Also like advertisements, the medium has become respectable, and it is perfectly normal to recommend a trailer just as you would any other piece of media. In short, the trailer as a form has taken on its share of cultural significance, influencing culture in ways different from movies. What had to happen, happened with Grindhouse: numerous trailers for films that have not, nor will ever be, actually made. This is how seduction works in The Game. It is a series of calculated gestures towards something that isn’t there — brave, glamorous, emotional life, life anew.

Attempts to re-codify intimacy over the long run, like The Rules, can achieve only limited success. The project isn’t original, and in a society that (consciously, at least) resists codification, anybody who is trying to use rules of any sort will seem desperate and inauthentic. New pick-up lines will be used up and discarded, and even body language will perhaps become a contested and intentional field.

However, what Luhmann calls the “radicalization of the difference between personal and impersonal relationships” will continue, and the world of the personal “connection” will continue merging with the world of excess and spectacle, which has likewise been excluded from the impersonal world and its ethic of efficiency. The emotive pop star is already this synthesis.

What appears to Luhmann as the possibly insoluble question of “how it is even possible to initiate personal communication in public situations” has been solved by the romantic equivalent of the trailer: cold-readings, flights of fancy, and acts of comradely ironic distantiation that all serve to simulate commonality through the fantasy of a good life, a shared life…and not only to simulate it. There is real commonality in the fact that the world is increasingly standardized and interconnected — crashing a wedding is not only possible, but desirable in a world where the same things go over everywhere. The ecstasy of Wedding Crashers is in the fact that Vince Vaughn and Owen Wilson’s characters do not merely blend in, sampling the caviar. They are at the center of the event, making toasts and balloon animals. It is imaginable that people would one day hire wedding crashers, just as they currently hire musicians and wedding planners. In a sense, Derren Brown’s marks were right to praise the accuracy of his psychic readings.

Considering the wretchedly lonely people who are picked as contestants for shows like The Pick-Up Artist, and considering the heartbreaking losses that cry out from every word of The Rules, it would be easy enough to end up on a note of wry sufferance, as Peter Guralnick does at the beginning of his exceptional study of Elvis, “In the end, there should be nothing shocking about human existence, because, in the end, whatever has occurred is simply human” (Last Train to Memphis xiv). But then I consider how well a pity party of this sort begs the question. After all, a survey of misogynistic male bloggers in the UK Observer ended like this: “I’m kind of wryly charmed. Maybe, once you get past the prostitutes and the posturing, even with these tough guys, all you need is love.” It reminds me of the useless psychologisms that dilute Strauss’s study of Mystery, and Paul Thomas Anderson’s study (in Magnolia) of Tom Cruise’s Frank Mackey: they weren’t loved enough as children, poor dears.

Or, on the other hand, I could side with conservative philosophers like Harry G. Frankfurt, who argued in On Bullshit that Americans are increasingly indifferent to the truth-value of discourse; inevitably, he would see seducers and rules-mongers as a monkey wrench gang that wants words and signifying acts to have power independent of the world, of the way things “really are.” But this betrays my own feeling that we do, in fact, inhabit fictions, and that the value of those fictions is determined in large part by our happiness, rather than by their fidelity to a vast and impersonal truth.

Instead, I will end by suggesting that the intertwined phenomena of individuality and intimacy are both vastly expensive fictions: expensive in time, and rich in failure. In the truest sense of the term, they are luxuries. Luhmann considered it “impossible to specify how selflessness and an orientation to the other person might become embedded in a broader and deeper understanding of exchange.” It isn’t enough to hold the line against seduction, or chicanery, or the irrational: the game is flawed. There is a chicken-and-egg problem here. I don’t see how we can embrace the larger fictions of selflessness and devotion without greater security, equality, and leisure, things one person cannot have at another’s expense. Nor do I see how, without that, we can hope to supplant the stingy, stagey drama of practiced interaction with something finer — as Yeats expressed it, with something wrought of high laughter, loveliness, and ease.

Culture, Fiction, and the Humanities

(x-posted to The Valve)

Timothy Burke, at his blog Easily Distracted, wrote a post some time ago arguing for a Department of Everything Studies. Scott Eric Kaufman at Acephalous responded, and so did Smurov (at the Valve) in turn.

One of the key paragraphs from Burke’s eminently readable post is as follows:

I want to go in the opposite direction: I want to collapse all departments concerned with the interpretation and practice of expressive culture into a single large departmental unit. I’d call it Cultural Studies, but I don’t want it to be Cultural Studies as that term is now understood in the American academy. Call it Department of the Humanities, or of Interpretation, or something more elegant and self-explanatory if you can think of it. I want English, Modern Languages, Dance, Theater, Art History, Music, the hermeneutical portions of philosophy, cultural and media studies, some strands of anthropology, history and sociology, and even a smattering of cognitive science all under one roof. I want what [John Holbo at the Valve] is calling Everything Studies, except that I want its domain limited to expressive culture.

I agree with Burke so much that I disagree with him. That may sound odd, but what I mean is that so far in the blogosphere (which is already a Department of Everything Studies) there has been a regrettable conflation of two distinct viewpoints. One the one hand, the blogosphere has enabled serious discussions about a new academic interdisciplinarity within the humanities, one capable of working with mixed media and synthesizing imaginative (e.g. literary) and analytical (e.g. philosophical) materials. On the other, people working in literary studies have in both surrendered to and indulged in the desire to downsize literary studies in favor of criticism of television shows, blockbuster films, comic books, pop songs, and other media. You can see both strains in what Burke has written.

If the humanities were to re-shape itself in order to accomodate the changing shape of culture, all of the analytical disciplines would combine — Philosophy, Political Science, English, Comparative Literature, History, Sociology, Anthropology, and the rest — while the creative disciplines would remain separate: Creative Writing, Dance, Theater, Musical Composition, and so on. Critics and scholars are not always good artists, and vice versa. The grounds for such a merger would be basically ideological. If we accept the idea that our beliefs about the world are essentially constructions, then it makes sense to give the study of those constructions the widest possible scope, such that they can range across politics, literature, philosophy, and so on. At Stanford, there is a Linguistics/Computer Science major entitled “Symbolic Systems.” Perhaps Symbolic Systems would be a good name for this new confluence of the human sciences.

If you do not accept the idea that the world is constructed by human beings, at least insofar as it is an object of concern for scholars in the humanities, then there is no point to a merger. The merger absolutely depends on the notion that works of fiction, and all other tropological acts of expression, are as “truthful” as a nation’s Constitution or a work of empiricist philosophy, and in the same way, less differences of rhetorical mode that do not parallel the usual fiction/non-fiction binary. Otherwise, Visual Studies professors can turn their attention to graphic novels (many already have), and Film or Media Studies or Communications professors can work on television shows and advertisements.

These discussions, the visible part of them, are the tip of the iceberg. Just below the surface is the fact that writers like Charles Dickens or Alexander Pope are less significant than they once were, and the general social apathy towards these writers also affects the scholars who are paid to study and teach them. Your time is limited: you can either keep up with Battlestar Galactica, or you can remedy some embarrassing gap in your knowledge of your own field, but you can’t (beyond a certain point) do both, since both literary specializations and popular culture now imply enormous territories. We live in a time of highly accessible digital media, and the consequences for text are real; if they weren’t, you wouldn’t see so many earnest Everything Bloggers discontinuing their blogs in order to write dissertations — that is, resuming their relationships with paperbacks and hardcovers at the expense of cultural studies and the blogosphere.

Look at how this anxiety informs the post at Acephalous. Scott writes,

Consider the example of “noir.” In order to present an accurate account of noir as a cultural phenomenon, you might begin with the novels of Raymond Chandler and Dashiell Hammett, but you’d be remiss if you ignored film noir, as it was not merely a contemporary phenomenon, but a complementary one. (Many of the early films being adaptations of the novels and/or written by the novelists.)

Obviously, film scholars do not feel the same way. A work like Nicholas Christopher’s Somewhere in the Night draws on noir literature, just as it draws on other literary works and academic disciplines, but it is not a series of close readings of Hammett’s or Chandler’s prose. So we end up with English scholars who want to encroach on other disciplines without making the claim (first introduced in Jean-Francois Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition) that they must make first about the breadth of cultural signification, and the analogy between fiction and culture.

Here is where the specific references that buttress these calls become both issues and problems. In all the time I’ve been reading blogs, I have never, ever seen somebody use When Harry Met Sally or so-called “chick lit” as an example of the need for Everything Studies. Instead, we get a very recognizable set of reference points, among them Harry Potter, comic books/graphic novels, and Buffy the Vampire Slayer (see Burke’s post). As long as these discussions are saturated by obvious pointers to personal interests, the discussion will have an unpleasant tang of disguised arbitrariness and dilettantism. For bloggers, even for academic bloggers, this isn’t a problem. You and I will find readers who share our interests, and even readers who share our depth of interest in each thing. But in terms of the academic tradition of the humanities, it is simply inadmissable. There may be good reasons for a continuing lack of symmetry between academia and the blogosphere.

Finally, it is important to remember that just because Everything Studies isn’t given official departmental recognition by universities doesn’t mean it isn’t part of our culture right now. Sites like Television Without Pity or Pitchfork Media already do a great deal of cultural “work,” and they do so with a willingness to actually criticize when they write criticism. My own experience writing about auteurs like Joss Whedon is that the academic blogosphere is incapable of taking seriously the flaws in a given work of popular culture. My guess is that this has two causes: academics are used to suspending value judgements when producing readings of canonical texts, and they would consider it ridiculous to hold Buffy the Vampire Slayer to the same standard as they do Little Dorrit. (For example, because of the obligations imposed by writing for network television, as though Dickens wasn’t writing a serial under equally rigorous commercial and formal constraints.) Anything less generous makes us anxious about turning into cultural conservatives a la Harold Bloom. But, in the process, we condescend to what they propose to analyze, and pay the price: our analyses are novelties, interesting but marginal. A site like Television Without Pity has no problem criticizing episodes of Buffy, because it truly, without strain, considers the other episodes among the best that is thought and said.

Elliott Smith

Elliott Smith’s rarities album, New Moon, has just come out, and I’ve been playing it for about a week, thinking about all his records and how to write about them. His death knocked the wind out of me. I got into Nirvana when Kurt Cobain was already dead, so I only grieved for him in a vague, abstract way. With Smith, on the other hand, although I didn’t have any personal grief, I did feel some unusually acute need to go back to the trail of songs and make sense out of them.

Every one of his songs is an elegy. They have precedents — John Lennon, Nick Drake, certain moods of Dylan’s, writers like the Beats and Bukowski — but they also inhabit a world of their own. There are songs about romantic failures, in which Smith blames himself for pushing a woman away, or hurting her, and wrecking his chance to escape to a place of redemption:

You had plans, for both of us
That involved, a trip out of town
To a place I’d seen, in a magazine
That you left lying around
(“Miss Misery”)

You once talked to me about love
And you painted pictures of
A never-never land
And I could have gone to that place
But I didn’t understand
(“I Didn’t Understand”)

The other dynamic in his songs, one that ultimately has more range and more sorrow and more angles, is what to do about people fucking up. Part of Smith longs to stay there with them, lap for lap, drink for drink, providing them with compassion and comfort.

Drink up baby, look at the stars
I’ll kiss you again between the bars
Where I’m seeing you there with your hands in the air
Waiting to finally be caught
(“Between the Bars”)

But the darker side of this is obvious to him; in one song, he talks about wrapping his “poison arms” around his lover. Not only is he complicit with them, and likewise imprisoned, but he’s actually helping render her or him more passive:

Do what I say and I’ll make you OK
And drive them away
The images stuck in your head

The people you you’ve been before
That you don’t want around around anymore
That push and shove and won’t bend to your will
I’ll keep them still

Not that this sort of power is any lasting prize; the person wastes and wastes away until they become remote again in death. Smith gets disgusted, and a lot of his songs have a sharp tone of moral judgement:

Baby Britain feels the best
Floating over a sea of vodka
Separated from the rest
Fights problems with bigger problems…
For someone half as smart
You’d be a work of art
You put yourself apart
And I can’t help until you start
(“Baby Britain”)

Then Smith stops short. He catches himself using the same kind of conditional, foreshortened language you find in self-help books and twelve-step programs. He realizes that he’s actually pulling away: if you’re going to try to get better, fine, but otherwise I can’t be around you. That makes him exactly like the guy in “No Name #2″ (it’s fitting that Smith uses the personal form of “Untitled”) who just lets a suicide happen:

A couple of words that hid a crime
“You’re just fine
You’ll be just fine
But I’m on the other line”

In the song, Smith makes the guy remember by physically attacking him. Anyway, he knows people who have come clean, gone straight. They’re still bled, only they’re “bled white.” They end up just as dead:

That’s the man she’s married to now
That’s the girl that he takes around town

She appears composed, so she is, I suppose
Who can really tell?
She shows no emotion at all
Stares into space like a dead china doll…
XO, Mom
It’s okay, it’s alright, nothing’s wrong
(“Waltz #2″)

Smith’s most astonishing songs live out this contradiction so fully that the one thing becomes the other thing. In songs like “Easy Way Out,” it’s impossible to tell whether the easy way out is being good, or falling down. In “Angeles,” which happens over the course of a day at the races, winning and losing get confused. In “Independence Day,” the Fourth of July is literally everything: mindless patriotism and optimism, independence, death, rapture, transformation, and, most of all, connection to another person:

I saw you at the perfect place
It’s gonna happen soon, but not today
So go to sleep, and make the change
I’ll meet you here tomorrow
Independence Day

***

Over at Irrelevant Narcissism, Brandon has a brilliant new post on Gray’s Anatomy in which he describes the program’s strange overlapping of romantic soap opera with the medical ethic of care. You can say this much about Elliott Smith’s unsolved music: it lays bare the devastating core of caring.

You say you mean well, you don’t know what you mean
Fucking oughta stay the hell away from things you know nothing about

I haven’t talked about the music yet. As most people know, Smith moved from playing mainly whisper-quiet, acoustic songs, to recording albums that mixed those songs with swelling, symphonic pop. Towards the end of his life, he started to write himself into every part of his passion play: he became the dying junkie and the big, indifferent success, both at the same time. He also started to inhabit his dreams, in part because he was playing anew with romancing heroin. Acoustic songs like “Memory Lane” and “Let’s Get Lost” had him actually escaping to a sort of paradise with his lover, like John Murdoch finally standing on the shores of Shell Beach. (This was all conscious: Smith also wrote a song called “A Distorted Reality Is Now A Necessity To Be Free.”)

As for the other songs, it’s impossible to know exactly what significance the crescendo had for Elliott Smith, but maybe part of it was an attempt to write something other than an elegy. Through the force and accumulation of instruments and sound, he stretches out the moment a little longer, endures longer without one person or the other disappearing — through misery or moralism — into themselves. To go anywhere, for him, was to go toward death. To hear his records, you have to watch with him a little while. You have to stay.

And everybody’s gone at last
Well, I hope you’re not waiting
Waiting around for me
Because I’m not going anywhere
Obviously